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REGULATE PHYsiciAN RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
TO IMPROVE HEALTHCARE
Judy Ann Clausen'
ABSTRACT
The U.S. healthcare reform agenda seeks to expand patient choice and access,
improve quality, and control costs. This Article argues these goals should govern
enforceability ofphysician non-compete and non-solicitation agreements (restrictive
covenants). Most jurisdictions apply a reasonableness test to assess the
enforceability ofphysician restrictive covenants. Somejurisdictions hold physician
non-competes per se invalid. Courts applying the reasonableness test often disrupt
continuity of care and harm patients; continuity of care is key to patient health.
Moreover, physicians departing a practice have an ethical obligation to notify
patients of the physician's departure and how to transfer to the physician's new
practice. Courts have heavily scrutinized a physician's notication to her patients
to determine whether the physician crossed the nebulous line from fulfilling
notification obligations to improper solicitation. Wary of liability for breach of a
non-solicitation agreement, doctors will likely avoid fulfilling their obligations to
notify patients, effectively preventing the patient from continuing treatment with her
doctor. This Article articulates a model framework for evaluating restrictive
covenants that protects patients and furthers healthcare reform goals. First,
practices should be required to allow departing physicians to access patient info to
fulfill patient notification obligations; courts should refuse to enforce
non-solicitation agreements prohibiting physicians from soliciting their own
patients. Otherwise, non-solicitation agreements potentially sever doctor-patient
relationships. Next, courts should refuse to enforce restrictive covenants in a way
that disrupts continuity of care or interferes with the doctor-patient relationship;
courts should clarify that non-competes can only restrict the location where a
physician practices and cannot prohibit a physician from treating her patients.
Finally, states should enact transactional incentives to lower costs to patients and
expandpatient choice and access by making covenant enforcement turn on the extent
to which the covenant supports healthcare reform goals. Current frameworks fail to
incentivize providers to: (1) accept lower reimbursement coverage such as
TRICARE, Medicare, and Medicaid and (2) reduce patient costs. This Article's
model provides these incentives.
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PHYSICIAN RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
INTRODUCTION
For five years, Albert has received HIV treatment from Dr. Smith from Sunshine
Medical. At Albert's most recent appointment, Dr. Smith informs Albert he will no
longer be able to treat Albert because Dr. Smith is starting a new practice. Dr.
Smith's contract with Sunshine Medical prohibits him from treating Sunshine
Medical's patients after Dr. Smith departs the practice. Albert must search for a new
physician. Switching doctors will negatively impact Albert's health.
Amelia, a Medicaid patient, has bipolar disorder. Amelia moves across the
country and is unable to find a psychiatrist who accepts Medicaid anywhere within
200 miles of her home. Amelia cannot afford to pay out-of-pocket. Her prescriptions
are running out.2 This Article addresses these common scenarios by crafting a model
framework for regulating physician restrictive covenants that expands patient choice
and access, improves quality, and controls healthcare costs.
Despite the American Medical Association's (AMA) assertion that physician
non-compete agreements are unethical if they fail to make reasonable
accommodation of patients' choice, patients often face disruption of care because of
doctors' perceptions of their contractual obligations.' Moreover, the AMA requires
a physician departing a practice to notify her patients that the physician is leaving,
the address of the new practice, and offer the patient the opportunity to have medical
records forwarded to the new practice. Courts have, however, held physicians liable
for breach of non-solicitation agreements and misappropriation of trade secrets when
they attempt to fulfill their patient notification ethical obligations. Punishing doctors
who cross the nebulous line from notifying to soliciting patients deters physicians
from fulfilling ethical obligations, disrupts continuity of care, and potentially
deprives patients of the choice to continue care with their physician.
States should adopt this Article's model framework for assessing the validity of
physician restrictive covenants to expand patient choice of providers and access to
care. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is under attack. Patients face increasing
obstacles to access to care. In 2017, the number of adults with health insurance
decreased. Even if the patient has coverage, that coverage may be simply a "card
without care."4 Physicians often turn away patients with lower reimbursement
coverage such as TRICARE, Medicare, and Medicaid.
States have failed to adequately incentivize doctors to accept patients with lower
reimbursement coverage. Modern frameworks for evaluating restrictive covenants
ignore the covenant's impact on the healthcare reform goals of expanding patient
choice and access, improving quality, and controlling costs. Instead, most
2 Although the names have changed, these situations actually occurred.
3 See Michelle Andrews, Did Your Doctor 'Ghost' You? An Employment Contract May Be To Blame,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 19, 2019), https://khn.org/news/did-your-doctor-ghost-you-an-
employment-contract-may-be-to-blame/ [https://perma.cc/2RSW-VJV9] (asserting that the AMA does
not "oppose restrictive covenants outright" but its policy notes that such covenants "can limit patients'
choices" and quoting Dr. Patrice Harris, the organization's president-elect, as stating "[t]o the extent that
these agreements disrupt continuity of care and disrupt patient choice, this is of great concern to the
AMA"); see infra Section I.A.
4 See infra Section I.C.i.
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jurisdictions apply some version of a reasonableness analysis.' Some jurisdictions
make physician non-competes per se invalid and vary in the degree to which they
enforce liquidated damages clauses. The per se invalidity approach often undermines
practices' attempts to control costs. The contemporary frameworks fail to
incentivize doctors to accept lower reimbursement coverage and often disrupt
continuity of care and therefore undermine quality of care. The time is ripe for
legislative reform; in a recent report evaluating how best to promote patient choice
and competition in healthcare, the Trump administration advised states to examine
non-competes' impact on patient access and physician supply.'
To expand patient choice and access, improve quality, and control costs, this
Article sets forth the following model framework for evaluating physician restrictive
covenants.
First, states should require group practices to allow departing physicians to access
patient information to fulfill patient notification responsibilities and refuse to enforce
non-solicitation agreements prohibiting a physician from soliciting her own patients.
Second, states should refuse to enforce restrictive covenants in a way that disrupts
continuity of care or interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. States should
clarify restrictive covenants can only restrict the location where a physician treats
patients and cannot prohibit a physician from treating patients.
Third, states should prohibit injunctions for breaches of physician restrictive
covenants and enforce only liquidated damages provisions.
Fourth, states should prohibit courts from rewriting overly broad restrictive
covenants. Otherwise, covenant holders have every incentive to draft overreaching
covenants with the knowledge the court will salvage the covenant to make it
reasonable.
Finally, states should enact transactional incentives for physicians to: (1) accept
lower reimbursement coverage, thereby expanding patient choice and access, and
(2) reduce costs to patients. Covenant enforcement should turn on the extent to which
the covenant furthers healthcare reform goals of expanding patient choice and access,
improving quality, and controlling costs.
I. BACKGROUND - PHYSICIAN RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
This Section provides background. Section I(A) explores physician
non-competes and illustrates that courts have enforced non-competes to disrupt
continuity of care and interfere with the doctor-patient relationship. Section I(B)
explores physician non-solicitation agreements and illustrates that physicians
departing practices have ethical obligations to notify patients. However, if a court
later determines the doctor has crossed the line from notification to solicitation, the
doctor may be liable for breach of a non-solicitation agreement and misappropriation
s S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Physician Restrictive Covenants: The Neglect of Incumbent Patient
Interests, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 189, 195-98 (2006) (asserting that courts uphold non-compete
agreements in most instances applying the rule of reason standard).
6 Andrews, supra note 3; cf D. Daniel Sokol, Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, 60 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1545, 1548 (2019) (asserting that critics of the current antitrust approach make antitrust the causal
factor for deteriorating healthcare).
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of trade secrets. Section I(C) explores the healthcare reform goals of: (i) maintaining
and expanding patient choice and access, (ii) maintaining and improving quality of
care, and (iii) containing and reducing costs. Section I(C)(4) explains physician
restrictive covenants have the potential to either support or undermine these goals.
A. Non-Compete Agreements
A physician non-compete is a provision "ancillary" to an "employment contract[]
[or] partnership agreement[]" in which the covenantor physician agrees to refrain
from practicing within a designated "geographic area for a specified period of time"
after termination of employment or withdrawal from the practice.' The AMA
"strongly disfavors [but does not prohibit] post-employment" physician
non-competes. First, the AMA regards physician non-competes "as unethical if they
restrict a patient's choice of physician." Moreover, the AMA posits that physician
non-competes "restrict competition, disrupt continuity of care, and potentially
deprive the public of medical services."io The AMA "discourages any agreement
which restricts the" physician from practicing "for a specified period of time or in a
specified area upon termination of an employment, partnership or corporate
agreement."" According to the AMA, physician non-competes "are unethical if they
are excessive in geographic scope or duration . .. or if they fail to make reasonable
accommodation of patients' choice of physician." 2
Despite the AMA's negative stance, physician non-competes are common and
enforceable in most jurisdictions, unlike lawyer non-competes.13 A recent survey of
nearly 2,000 primary care physicians determined that roughly 45% of the physicians
were bound by non-competes.'4 Scholars argue physician non-competes should be
unenforceable just like lawyer non-competes; the doctor-patient relationship is as
vital and sensitive as the lawyer-client relationship.5 The New Jersey Hospital
Association, however, argued that physician non-competes are different than lawyer
Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete Between Physicians: Protecting
Doctors' Interests at Patients' Expense, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 2 n.9 (1992).
Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More, 869 A.2d 884, 891 (N.J. 2005).
9 Id.
'n Id. at 896.
12 Id; see also Malloy, supra note 5, at 207 (asserting that the AMA guidelines "state that once [the]
physician-patient relationship is formed, the physician has a legal and ethical duty to continue providing
care as long as the patient needs" the care); Robert Steinbuch, Why Doctors Shouldn't Practice Law: The
American MedicalAssociation's Misdiagnosis ofPhysician Non-Compete Clauses, 74 Mo. L. REV. 1051,
1051, 1054-55 (2009) (asserting that the AMA has failed to protect patients and has allowed predatory
behavior by existing medical practices and so should adopt rules prohibiting non-competes similar to
those adopted by the American Bar Association); Restrictive Covenants, AM. MED. ASS'N,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/restrictive-covenants [https://perma.cc/Z7BM-QD5S].
13 See Cmty. Hosp. Grp., 869 A.2d at 892-95.
14 Andrews, supra note 3.
15 See, e.g., Alina Klimkina, Note, Are Noncompete Contracts Between Physicians Bad Medicine?
Advocating in the Affirmative by Drawing a Public Policy Parallel to the Legal Profession, 98 KY. L.J.
131, 132, 149-53 (2010) (advocating for an approach paralleling the legal and medical professions and
holding non-competes in medicine unethical).
2019-2020 115
KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL
non-competes.16 A lawyer non-compete prohibits the lawyer "from having any
relationship with a client."' 7 A physician non-compete, however, "only restricts the
location where the physician can have a relationship with the patient" and does not
prohibit the physician from treating patients."s
Although supporters of physician non-competes may argue that physician
non-competes do not prohibit a physician from treating patients and only limit the
location in which the physician treats patients,'I this is not true in every case. Courts
have enforced physician non-competes which disrupt continuity of care, interfere
with the doctor-patient relationship, and prevent a doctor from treating a patient.
20
Moreover, courts and legislatures have provided insufficient and inconsistent
guidance.2 1 Doctors and practice groups may not realize that they should avoid
forming non-competes prohibiting doctors from treating patients and should only
form non-competes limiting the location in which doctors can practice. For this
reason, practice groups are likely forming non-competes prohibiting physicians from
treating their patients after they depart practices. If these departing physicians
comply with their contractual obligations, patients will suffer.
For example, in Dental East, P. C. v. Westercamp, the court enforced a restrictive
covenant that essentially prohibited a dentist from: (1) treating his patients for two
years after terminating his employment and (2) notifying his patients of his departure
from the practice.22 To comply with the covenant the court deemed enforceable, the
dentist would have to: (1) disrupt his patients' continuity of care and (2) shirk patient
notification obligations. The covenant was between a professional corporation
owned by a dentist and another dentist and stated that the professional corporation
owned all patient records.23 For two years after the dentist's departure from the
practice, the covenant prohibited the dentist: (1) from practicing within twenty miles
of the professional corporation and (2) from contacting or informing any patient of
the professional corporation, including the departing dentist's patients.
24 This
combination of obligations essentially prohibited the dentist from treating his own
patients for two years. The dentist terminated his employment and practiced dentistry
within one mile of the professional corporation.
25 Accordingly, the professional
corporation filed suit to enforce the covenant.
26 Despite the fact that the trial court
determined the covenant was "unduly restrictive and unenforceable," the appellate
court held the covenant was enforceable and reasonable.
27 The appellate court
reached this conclusion, in part, because the covenant did not penalize the dentist for
16 Cmty. Hosp. Grp., 869 A.2d at 893.
1
7 Id.
18 Id.
19 See id. at 894.
20 See supra text accompanying notes 22-39.
21 See supra text accompanying notes 22-39; see supra Section II.B.
22 Dental East, P.C. v. Westercamp, 423 N.W.2d 553, 554-55 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
23 Id. at 554.
24 id.
25 id.
26 
Id.
27 Id. at 554-55.
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"performing dental services on persons who had not been patients."28 Instead, the
covenant required the dentist to pay "40% of whatever production done" for services
performed on persons who had been patients of record of the professional
corporation, even though these patients had presumably been the departing dentist's
patients.29 Therefore, the court enforced a restrictive covenant that prohibited a
dentist from treating his own patients and even from notifying his own patients of
his departure; the court sent the message to doctors that courts will enforce
non-competes that essentially sever the doctor-patient relationship.
In Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, the restrictive covenant prohibited the
physician from treating his patients and went further than limiting the location in
which the physician could treat patients.30 For three years after leaving the practice,
the covenant prohibited the physician from providing "medical care . . . for any
person or persons who were patients" of the practice while the physician worked for
the practice."1 Even though the Court declined to enforce the covenant,3 2 the
covenant demonstrates that practices do, in fact, ask physicians to enter non-
competes which prohibit physicians from treating their own patients when the
physician leaves the original practice.
In Prairie Eye Center, Ltd. v. Butler, the court stated it was bound to enforce the
physician non-compete, despite the court's acknowledgment that the public policy
concerns were not different between the rights of clients to keep and choose their
lawyers and the rights of patients to keep and choose their doctors. The departing
physician argued the non-compete was unenforceable, especially as to patients the
physician brought to the covenant holder's practice, and that the covenant holder had
no protectable interest in those patients.34 The departing physician argued a
covenant-holder practice only had a protectable interest in patients when an
established practice hired a new physician who gained the practice's patient base.35
His case was different-he had an established practice and brought his patients to
the covenant holder.3 6 Finding that practices have a protectable interest in the patients
of their physicians, the court rejected the departing physician's argument.37 The
covenant holder did not need to present evidence of a protectable interest in the
departing physician's patients that the physician had brought to the covenant holder's
practice because these were the patients for whom the covenant holder negotiated.3 8
The court upheld the award of damages and injunctive relief, barring the departing
physician from practicing for an additional two-year term, pursuant to the non-
compete's extension for physician breach.3 1 Physicians can reasonably infer from
28 Id. at 555.
29 Id. at 554.
30 Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999).
3 Id. at 1279.
32 Id. at 1286.
3 Prairie Eye Center, Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 420-21 (111. App. Ct. 2002).
34 Id. at 421.
35 Id.
36 d.
37 Id. at 421-22.
31 Id. at 422.
3 Id. at 423-24.
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cases like Prairie Eye Center that courts will enforce non-competes that prohibit
doctors from treating their patients, even patients the departing physician brought to
the covenant-holder practice.
B. Non-Solicitation Agreements
In the healthcare context, a non-solicitation agreement is a contract prohibiting a
physician from soliciting patients of a practice to join the physician in the physician's
new practice.40 Courts have looked to Black's Law Dictionary to define "solicit,"
which is defined as "[t]o appeal to (for something); . . . to ask earnestly; to ask for
the purpose of receiving; to endeavor to obtain by asking or pleading; to entreat,
implore, or importune; to make petition to; to plead for; to try to obtain."
4'
There is a subtle distinction between solicitation and notification. A physician
has an ethical responsibility to notify patients the physician has treated that the
physician is departing a practice and to advise patients about the location of the new
practice.42 The duties a physician departing a practice owes to her patients stem from
the Hippocratic oath---"[t]he interest of the patient is paramount. . . everything that
can reasonably and lawfully be done to serve that interest must be done by all
physicians who have served or are serving the patient."' The AMA Code of Ethics
states that patients' best interests require a physician departing a practice to notify
patients of the physician's departure and the address of the new practice and to offer
patients the opportunity to have their medical records forwarded to the new
practice." The group should not interfere with the departing physician's discharge
of these duties and, accordingly, should not withhold patient lists.
45 Although the
AMA requires patient notification, the AMA does not authorize the departing
physician to solicit patients from the practice.4
Distinguishing between patient notification and solicitation is challenging.
47 If a
court determines the doctor has crossed the line from notification to solicitation, the
court may hold the doctor liable for breaching a non-solicitation agreement and for
misappropriation of trade secrets.
48 This potential liability makes departing
physicians wary of fulfilling ethical patient notification obligations; they fear a court
'o See, e.g., Total Care Physicians, P.A. v. O'Hara, No. Civ.A.99C-1ll-201-JRS, 2002 WL
31667901, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 2002); David R. Dearden, Understanding
Confidentiality and Nonsolicitation Clauses, AAFP FAM. PRAC. MGMT., July-Aug. 2000,
https://www.aafp.org/fpm/2000/070
0/p7 3 .html# [https://perma.cc/2V2N-NL2N].
41 Id. at *8 (citing Aetna Bldg. Maint. Co. v. West, 246 P.2d 11, 15 (Cal. 1952)).
42 Id. at *5-6 (citing CODE OF MED. ETHICS §§ 7.01, 7.03 (AM. MED. AsS'N 1994)).
4 Id. at *5 (quoting CODE OF MED. ETHICS § 7.01 (AM. MED. Ass'N 1994)).
44id
45 
Id.
46 Id. at *6.
47 See, e.g., Dickinson Med. Grp., P.A. v. Foote, No. 834-K, 1984 WL 8208, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 10,
1984) (enjoining a doctor from using patient lists to contact patients even though the doctor believed she
was only notifying patients of her upcoming departure from practice); Total Care Physicians, 2002 WL
31667901, at *7 (stating the propriety of physician's communications with patients about upcoming
departure from practice raised question of first impression in Delaware, with the exception of some
guidance from the Foote case).
48 See Foote, 1984 WL 8208, at *1, *3.
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will later decide that communications the doctor perceived to be patient notification
were, in fact, improper solicitation.49
For example, in Dickinson Medical Group, P.A. v. Foote, the court held the
departing physician liable for breach of non-solicitation agreement and for
misappropriation of trade secrets when she used patient lists to contact patients.50
The departing physician used patient lists to notify her patients of her departure.s"
The practice sued her for breach of non-solicitation agreement and misappropriation
of trade secrets.52 The physician argued that she had the ethical responsibility to
notify patients that she was leaving the practice, and that she should be authorized to
use patient lists to contact her patients to fulfill these obligations.5 1 The practice
argued that the physician breached the non-solicitation agreement and
misappropriated trade secrets by surreptitiously removing confidential medical
records to assist in starting her new practice.54 The court ruled in favor of the practice,
enjoining the departing physician from using the lists to contact patients she had
treated.55 The court was concerned the physician would solicit her patients from her
former practice, in breach of the non-solicitation agreement, and irreparably harm
the former practice.5 ' Although the court acknowledged a departing physician's
patient notification obligations, the court enjoined the physician from using patient
lists to notify patients herself."
Similarly, in Total Care Physicians v. O'Hara, the court held a physician liable
for misappropriating trade secrets and breaching a non-solicitation agreement
because the court determined the physician used patient information to solicit his
patients from the practice he was departing." The departing physician believed he
was fulfilling his ethical obligations to notify patients of his departure." The court
scrutinized every word of the physician's letter to his patients from the practice he
departed.o Based on a review of the AMA standards and corresponding Delaware
public policy and case law, the court concluded that a proper communication should
notify the patient of (1) the physician's departure, (2) the location of the physician's
new practice, and (3) the means by which the patient can transfer medical records to
the new practice, if the patient chooses.61
The court emphasized that notification letters "should not ... encourage" the
physician's patients to transfer care.62 The court acknowledged that the departing
physician properly (1) announced his departure and (2) advised patients on how to
49 See, e.g., id. at *2.
'
0 
Id. at *1, *3.
s' Id. at *1.
52 id
s Id. at *2.
54 Id. at *1-2.
s Id at *3.
56 id.
s Id. at *2-3.
s' Total Care Physicians v. O'Hara, No. Civ.A.99C-ll-201-JRS, 2002 WL 31667901, at *1 (Del.
Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 2002).
s9 Id. at *2.
60 Id at *3, *9.
61 Id at *9.
62 Id.
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transfer records.63 Because the departing physician "tout[ed]" the "quality of care"
and facilities offered at the new practice, however, the letter was an improper
solicitation." Even though the court recognized that the doctor could properly use
patient lists to notify patients, the doctor could not use patient lists to solicit
patients.65 The court held that the departing physician misappropriated trade secrets
contained in the patient lists and breached the non-solicitation agreement when the
physician solicited patients."
6
Punishing doctors who cross the line from notification to solicitation of patients
deters physicians from fulfilling ethical obligations, disrupts continuity of care, and
potentially deprives patients of choice of providers. Physicians, afraid of liability for
misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of non-solicitation agreements, will
refrain from contacting their patients. A patient who never learns (1) her doctor is
leaving the practice, (2) her doctor's new address, (3) how to transfer records to her
doctor, and (4) that she can choose to continue treatment with her doctor will likely
experience disruption of care. Disruption of continuity of care leads to poorer health
outcomes. Worried about suits brought by a former practice, doctors may refrain
from treating their patients from the former practice. Even though this more cautious
approach may insulate the doctor from suits from the former practice, the approach
breaches ethical obligations to patients, disrupts continuity of care, and deprives
patients of the ability to continue treatment with their doctors.
C. Healthcare Reform Goals
This Section explores three interrelated healthcare reform goals and explains that
physician restrictive covenants can support or undermine these goals.
i. Maintain and Expand Patient Choice and Access
The rate of adults without health insurance rose in 2017 as the Trump
administration tried to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
67 In the
current political climate, the long-term future of the ACA is uncertain.
68 The
percentage of adults in the United States (U.S.) without health insurance may
continue to rise." Without coverage, these individuals face tremendous obstacles to
accessing care. Without either private health insurance or coverage from a
governmental program, individuals must pay out-of-pocket for medical care. With
63 Id.
64 Id.
6s Id. at *3, *5.
66 Id. at *1, *9, *11.
67 Lauren Thomas, The Number ofAmericans Without Health Insurance Rose in First Quarter 2017,
CNBC (Apr. 11, 2017, 11:59 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/0
4/11/the-number-of-anericans-
without-health-insurance-rose-in-first-quarter-2017.html [https://perma.cc/CZ6Y-HCNF].
68 Id. (citing Zac Auter, U.S. Uninsured Rate Edges Up Slightly, GALLUP (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/
2 0 8 196/uninsured-rate-edges-slightly.aspx [https://perma.cc/8JR3-CPLV]).
6
1 See id. ("Amid the uncertainty, several major insurers have already announced they are abandoning
some health exchanges for 2018 plans, implying coverage options could dwindle further, and premiums
could rise even higher across the U.S.").
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an ever-growing percentage of the population paying out-of-pocket for care,
controlling costs becomes even more important for the healthcare consumer.
Even individuals with health coverage, such as military families, often face
barriers to access to care because providers refuse to accept the coverage.70
TRICARE is the Department of Defense's healthcare program covering
approximately 9.4 million active duty military members and their families, National
Guard/Reserve members and their families, retirees, survivors, and some former
spouses." A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that civilian
providers too often turn away TRICARE patients, causing a "potential problem with
(beneficiaries) getting access to care." 72 According to the study, private doctors turn
away TRICARE patients because the doctors are dissatisfied with reimbursement
amounts." Moreover, "[t]he number of private doctors accepting [] TRICARE
patients is trending downwards."74 The study indicated that only about 39% of
civilian mental health providers accepted TRICARE patients." In California and
Texas, nearly all providers accepted new patients, but less than half accepted
TRICARE patients.7 6
Similarly, the number of physicians dropping Medicare patients has been steadily
rising.77 Medicare is a govermnent-funded health insurance program "for senior
citizens, young people with certain disabilities, and patients with end-stage renal
disease."7 ' A 2018 report revealed that many doctors have opted out of Medicare and
will likely opt out in increasing rates in the future.79 Doctors cite low reimbursement
rates and burdensome paperwork and reporting requirements as reasons for opting
out.8 0 Recent studies indicated that 22,000 doctors no longer accept Medicare
patients." While most doctors continue to treat current Medicare patients, some have
decided not to accept new Medicare patients.8 2 Therefore, the access to healthcare
70 E.g., Gregg Zoroya, Civilian Doctors Wary ofAccepting Military's Tricare, USA TODAY (Apr.
3, 2013, 11:15 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/naion/2013/04/03/tricare-doctors-
insurance/2047569/ [https://perma.cc/6MEW-CD66].
7 Nurnber of Beneficiaries, TRICARE (Jan. 4, 20191 htps//WWW.tiCare.mil/abotfaCt/enenumbe
[https//permacc/3XJD-MSAH]; Tricare Eligibilty, MiLrfARY.COM, https//www.military.com/benefits/ticare/fricare-
eligibilitylhtml [https.//permaccZCJ948ZY].
72 Zoroya, supra note 70 (quoting Debra Draper, the director of a study conducted by the GAO); see
also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-364, DEFENSE HEALTH CARE: TRICARE
MULTIYEAR SURVEYS INDICATE PROBLEMS WITH ACCESS TO CARE FOR NONENROLLED BENEFICIARIES
3, 17 (2013) [hereinafter DEFENSE HEALTH CARE].7 DEFENSE HEALTH CARE, supra note 72, at 31-32, 38, 41; Zoroya, supra note 70.
74 Zoroya, supra note 70.
7 DEFENSE HEALTH CARE, supra note 72, at 29.
76 Zoroya, supra note 70.
7 Thomas Wright, Can Doctors Refuse Patients Covered Under Medicare?, FIRSTQUOTE MEDICARE
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.firstquotemedicare.com/medicare-news/can-doctors-refuse-medicare-
patients [https://perma.cc/UZ4M-5DFC].
78 id.
7 See Leslie Kane, Medscape Physician Compensation Report 2018, MEDSCAPE (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.medscape.com/slideshow/2018-compensation-overview-6009667 (click to slide 27, which is
entitled "Are Physicians Dropping Medicare and Medicaid Patients?").
80 Id.
81 Wright, supra note 77.
82 Kane, supra note 79 (click to slide 27).
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problem will likely worsen in the future, especially because the large baby boomer
generation is becoming Medicare eligible.
83 Doctors opting out of Medicare has been
a consistent trend, in 2012, the number of doctors treating Medicare patients was
falling and had nearly tripled from 2009.84
In addition, Seema Verma, an administrator for the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, described the "dismally low" physician acceptance rate of
Medicaid patients as a "card without care."" In 2013, the percentage of physicians
accepting new Medicaid patients was 68.9%, nearly 20% lower than acceptance rates
for Medicare and privately insured patients.1
6 Health and Human Services Secretary
Tom Price indicated that "one out of every three physicians in this nation aren't
seeing Medicaid patients."" Medicaid "has nearly 69 million enrollees" and "is
operated with state and federal matching funds."
88 The ACA Medicaid expansion,
which 31 states and the District of Columbia implemented, expanded coverage
outside of traditional enrollees to low-income families, pregnant women, children,
people with disabilities, and elderly people.
8 9 Now, "all individuals under age 65
who earn up to 13 percent of the federal poverty level" are eligible for Medicaid in
states that have implemented the ACA expansion.
0
To maximize profits and ease administrative burdens, many doctors
prioritize privately insured patients over Medicaid patients.
91 Physician Medicaid
participation rates vary by specialty.
92 In some specialties, there is a crisis.
93 For
example, more than half of psychiatrists will not accept new Medicaid patients."
Lower Medicaid reimbursement rates are correlated with lower physician
participation rates for Medicaid "as compared with Medicare or private insurance."
95
States vary widely in reimbursement rates, and the higher the state reimbursement
rate, the more likely doctors in that state participate in Medicaid.
96 Medicaid's
paperwork burden, payment delays, and the "high clinical burden" of Medicaid
patients, who tend to have more health problems than privately insured patients, also
83 Tucker Doherty, Medicare's Time Bomb, in 7 Charts, POLITICO (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2018/09/12/medicare-baby-boomers-trust-fund-0006
94
[https://perma.cclRYP8-4LZM].
84 Greg Bengel, Doctors Refuse to Accept Medicare Patients, HEALTH IT OUTCOMES (Aug. 9, 2013),
https://www.healthitoutcomes.com/doc/doctors-refuse-to-accept-medicare-patients-
0 001
[https://penna.cc/3J6K-3FUX] (stating that 9,539 physicians opted out in 2012, compared with 3,700 in
2009, and 81% of family doctors accepted new Medicare patients in 2012, compared with 83% in 2010).
8 Sumit Agarwal, Physicians Who Refuse to Accept Medicaid Patients Breach Their Contract with
Society, STAT NEWS (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/12/28/medicaid-physicians-
social-contract/ [https://perma.cc/HD5G-RVTR].
86 Lori Robertson, Medicaid's Doctor Participation Rates, FACTCHECK.ORG (Mar. 29, 2017),
https:[/www.factcheck.org/2017/03/medicaids-doctor-participation-rates//[https//penacc/QAG5-TRYM].
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
9' Agarwal, supra note 85.
92 Robertson, supra note 86.
93Id.
94 id.
9 Id.
96 id.
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influence doctors to opt out of Medicaid.97
In addition to providers refusing to accept their coverage, many patients'
geographic location causes barriers to access. For example, a shortage of primary
care physicians in rural communities negatively impacts the health and life
expectancy of rural patients.98 A 2017 GAO report indicated that "physician
maldistribution significantly impacts rural communities."9 "The patient-to-primary
care physician ratio in rural areas is only 39.8 physicians per 100,000 people,
compared to 53.3 physicians per 100,000 [people] in urban areas."ioo "[A]n increase
of one primary care physician per 10,000 people is associated with an average" of
nearly 50 "fewer deaths per 100,000 [people] per year."'0o A Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention study revealed that limited access to primary care physicians
is one of the factors contributing to reduced lifespans of rural patients.'02 A
longitudinal study illustrated that a patient's zip code may have an equivalent impact
on that patient's health and life expectancy as the patient's genetic code.'0 3
Finally, provider shortage is an "escalating crisis" in some medical specialties.'
Even though this shortage disproportionately impacts rural patients, all patients face
barriers to access to specialty care.' For example, nationally, there is a growing
97 id.
9 Encouraging Healthy Communities: Perspective from the U.S. Surgeon General: Hearing Before S. Comm.
on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, Il5th Cong. 2-3 (2017) (statement of Ameriean Academy of Family
Physicians) [hereinafter Hearing], https/vww.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/document/advocacy/preventior/strategy/ST-
SenateHELP-HealthyCommunitiesHeaing-I I 517.pdf[https-//pemna.cc/322H-EWEQJ.
9 Id. at 2; see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-411, PHYSICIAN
WORKFORCE: LOCATIONS AND TYPES OF GRADUATE TRAINING WERE LARGELY UNCHANGED, AND
FEDERAL EFFORTS MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO MEET NEEDS 3, 12 (2017),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684946.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV2G-6PNC] (describing the impact of
poor distribution of physicians on rural communities).
'" Hearing, supra note 98, at 2.
"' Id. at 1.
102 Id. at 2; see also Ernest Moy et al., Leading Causes of Death in Nonmetropolitan and
Metropolitan Areas-United States, 1999-2014, 66 CDC MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REPORT: SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES, no. 1, Jan. 2017, at 1, 2, 5,
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/ss/pdfs/ss6601.pdf [https://perma.cc/T68V-4Y4H].
103 Hearing, supra note 98, at 2; see also Laura Dwyer-Lindgren et al., Inequalities in Life Expectancy
Among US Counties, 1980 to 2014: Temporal Trends and Key Drivers, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED., no.
7, July 2017, at 1003, 1004 (finding large and increasing geographical disparities in life expectancy across
counties); Miriam Jordan, Rural Areas Brace for a Shortage ofDoctors Due to Visa Policy, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/us/doctor-shortage-visa-policy.html
[https://perma.cc/Z7YB-MRUE] (discussing a government policy affecting foreign doctors who practice
in rural US areas); Olga Khazan, Why Are There So Few Doctors in Rural America?, THE ATLANTIC
(Aug. 28, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/08/why-wont-doctors-move-to-rural-
america/379291/ [https://perma.cc/64EU-KMZ7] (analyzing the challenges facing primary care doctors
practicing in rural areas); Brian Koenig, U.S. Physician Shortage to Impact Rural, Poor Urban Areas,
The NEW AMERICAN (June 18, 2013), https://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/health-care/item/1 5744-
u-s-physician-shortage-to-impact-rural-poor-urban-areas [https://perma.cc/Z2PM-HDYL] (examining a
study of the low availability of primary care doctors in rural areas).
10 E.g., MERRITT HAWKINS, 2017 REVIEW OF PHYSICAL AND ADVANCED PRACTITIONER
RECRUITING INCENTIVES (24th ed. 2017),
https://www.merritthawkins.com/uploadedFiles/MerrittHawkins/Pdf/2017 Physician Incentive
_ReviewMerrittHawkins.pdf [https://perma.cc/S539-FK5E] (characterizing the shortage of
psychiatrists as an "escalating crisis"); see supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
105 See David Levine, What's the Answer to the Shortage of Mental Health Care Providers?, U.S.
2019-2020 123
shortage of mental healthcare providers." According to a projection, there will be a
shortage of 250,000 mental healthcare providers in 2025.107 The shortage "is most
acute in rural areas" as mental health providers, like other healthcare providers, "tend
to cluster in urban areas."' "More than half of U.S. counties have zero psychiatrists"
and "[a]bout 111 million people live in 'mental health professional shortage'
areas."'" The mental healthcare professional shortage causes two thirds of primary
care doctors to face "difficulty referring patients for mental health care," twice that
of other specialties.i'
ii. Maintain and Improve Quality
Studies indicate continuity of care improves quality of care."' Moreover,
"involuntary termination" of the doctor-patient relationship may potentially have a
long-lasting negative impact on patients."
2 Continuity of care is care given by a
single doctor over a period of time to a patient that builds an evolving relationship
between the doctor and patient.1' The key relationship for continuity of care is that
between doctor and patient, not that between clinic and patient."
4 Patients who have
continuity of care tend to be more satisfied with their care,"' and satisfied patients
tend to comply with instructions from their doctors."
6 Compliance with doctors'
instructions is key to positive healthcare outcomes.' '7 Moreover, patients with
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (May 25, 2018, 12:16 PM), https://health.usnews.com/health-care/patient-
advice/articles/2018-05-25/whats-the-answer-to-the-shortage-of-mental-health-care-providers
[https://perma.cc/557B-A62L].
1" Id.
107 id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
o Id.
"1 Malloy, supra note 5, at 204 (citing Margaret M. Love et al., Continuity of Care and the Physician-
Patient Relationship, 49 J. FAM. PRAC. 998, 1002 (2000)); see also Total Care Physicians, P.A. v. O'Hara,
No. Civ.A.99C-11-201-JRS, 2002 WL 31667901, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 2002) (stating that the
Delaware legislature "has recognized the importance of maintaining [] continuity of care by protecting
the physician-patient relationship").
112 Malloy, supra note 5, at 204 (citing Tim Stokes et al., Ending the Doctor-Patient Relationship in
General Practice: A Proposed Model, 21 FAM. PRAC. 507, 513 (2004)).
"3 Id. at 204 (citing Continuity of Care, Definition of, AM. ACAD. OF FAM. PHYSICIANS,
https://www.aafp.org/about/policies/all/defnition-care.html [https://perma.cc/7SCX-55KXI).
114 Id. (citing Arch G. Mainous III & James M. Gill, The Importance of Continuity of Care in the
Likelihood ofFuture Hospitalization: Is Site of Care Equivalent o a Primary Clinician?, 88 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1539, 1539-40 (1998)) (asserting that the physician-patient relationship is key, not the
clinic-patient relationship).
"s Malloy, supra note 5, at 205 (stating that "[c]ontinuity of care has been linked to improved patient
satisfaction"); Paul A. Nutting et al., Continuity of Primary Care: To Whom Does It Matter and When?,
I ANNALS OF FAM. MED., no. 3, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 149, 154 (concluding that continuity of care is
associated with more positive assessments of visits and is particularly important for more vulnerable
patients and recommending efforts to maintaining continuous relationships with patients).
.. 6 Malloy, supra note 5, at 205 (citing Marjorie A. Bowman, Good Physician-Patient Relationship
= Improved Patient Outcome?, 32 J. FAM. PRAC. 135, 136 (1991)).
117 See id. at 205 (asserting as an example that Type II Diabetes patients who have continuity of care
with their doctors have better glucose control because they tend to follow their doctors' recommended
lifestyle changes).
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long-term relationships with their physicians tend to better use preventative services
and screenings, such as colonoscopies and mammograms,"' which are key to
improving the health and longevity of patients.
iii. Contain and Reduce Costs
The U.S. healthcare system is the most expensive in the world."' Other
comparably wealthy countries spend about half as much per person on healthcare as
nunthe United States does.120 In 2017, U.S. healthcare spending per person was 28%
higher than Switzerland, "the next highest per capita spender."1 21 Since the 1980s,
healthcare spending grew at a greater percentage of the overall U.S. economy than
healthcare spending of comparably wealthy nations.122 For instance, in 2017, the
U.S. spent 17% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on healthcare; "the next highest
comparable country (Switzerland) devoted [only] 12% of its GDP."123 Healthcare
spending through public funds in the United States is more commensurate with
public spending in comparably wealthy countries than is private spending.124
Therefore, individual U.S. citizens pay more of their own funds for healthcare than
people do in comparably wealthy nations.125
Barriers to access and disruption in continuity of care exacerbate the bloated costs
of U.S. health care.126 High-quality primary care helps reduce per capita costs.127
Patients who have "a usual source of care" incur lower healthcare costs because they
are healthier, use fewer healthcare resources, and resolve healthcare needs in a
cost-efficient manner.128 In contrast, patients "without a usual source of care" do not
receive timely, necessary intervention and more frequently visit emergency rooms
and have unnecessary tests and procedures, making the U.S. healthcare system
overly expensive.129 Patients with "a usual source of care" also benefit from better
coordination amongst providers;30 this coordination improves health outcomes and
reduces costs.
"' Id. at 205-06 (citing studies indicating that continuity of care was linked to patients using
"preventative services, such as breast and cervical cancer screening .. . and vaccination [of] children").
"' Jessica Glenza, Sky-high Prices of Everything Make US Healthcare the World's Most Expensive,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/mar/13/us-
healthcare-costs-causes-drug-prices-salaries [https://perma.cc/MBB5-DQ5S]; see Bradley Sawyer &
Cynthia Cox, How Does Health Spending in the U.S. Compare to Other Countries?, PETERSON-KAISER
HEALTH SYSTEM TRACKER (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-
spending-u-s-compare-countries [https://perma.cc/B8PH-8W8N].
120 Sawyer & Cox, supra note 119.
121 id.
122 id
123 d
124 id.
125 See id.
126 See supra Section I.C.i.
127 Hearing, supra note 98, at 1.
128 Id. at. 2.
129 id.
o id.
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iv. Physician Restrictive Covenants Support or Undermine
Healthcare Reform Goals
1. The Potential to Support Healthcare Reform Goals
Physician restrictive covenants have the potential to help control costs to patients.
In fact, the Medical Society of New Jersey argued that physician non-competes
"serve the legitimate purpose[s] of encouraging investment in new physicians" and
"protecting the established physicians" when hiring.
3 ' Physician restrictive
covenants allow covenant holders to collect damages corresponding to debts incurred
in setting up the practice of the departing physician.'
32 If covenant holders cannot
protect that investment, they may be forced to raise costs to patients to recoup the
loss.'33 Moreover, they may be forced to decline lower reimbursement coverage as a
result of the un-recouped investment in the departing physician who set up a
competing practice.'34 Therefore, all-out prohibition on physician restrictive
covenants could lead to: (1) increased costs to patients, and (2) barriers to access to
patients with lower reimbursement coverage such as Medicaid, Medicare, and
TRICARE.1 35
Regulation of physician restrictive covenants, however, must ensure patients
realize the cost savings and increased access that restrictive covenants have the
potential to support.136 If the framework for evaluating the physician restrictive
covenant fails to incentivize providers to: (1) control costs to patients and (2) accept
lower reimbursement coverage such as Medicaid, Medicare, and TRICARE,
restrictive covenants will not support the healthcare reform goals.'
3 7 Amelia, a
patient in need of a psychiatrist who accepts Medicaid, will not realize the potential
for restrictive covenants to increase access to Medicaid patients unless states
incentivize doctors to accept Medicaid.1
38
One proponent of physician non-competes argued that physician "[n]oncompetes
are good for the patients because they help to provide stability within a practice and
ensure continuity of care,"'39 presumably because non-competes incentivize
contractually bound physicians to remain with their current practices and deter them
from relocating. Conversely, if a physician really wants to leave a practice, a
physician restrictive covenant has the potential to incentivize the physician to
practice in an underserved area, such as a rural area.'
4o For example, Amelia has
1' Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More, 869 A.2d 884, 892 (N.J. 2005).
132 See infra Section II.B.
' 3 See infra Section II.B.ii.
134 See infra Section II.B.ii.
13 See infra Section II.B.ii.
16 See infra Section III.B.v.
'" See infra Section III.B.v.
13 See infra Section III.B.v.
'3 Andrews, supra note 3.
'4 Kevin D. Koons, Physician Employee Non-Compete Agreements on the Examining Table: The
Need to Better Protect Patients' and the Public's Interests in Indiana, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 253,
259-60 (2009) ("If a physician is already located in an adequately served area, enforcing his non-compete
agreement could force him to move into a medically underserved area.").
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moved to a geographic area in which there is a shortage of psychiatrists. A
non-compete could incentivize a psychiatrist leaving a practice in New York City to
relocate to this underserved geographic area.'41 For patients like Amelia who live in
underserved areas to realize the potential for restrictive covenants to incentivize
providers to move to underserved areas, there must be transactional incentives for
doctors to move to underserved areas. Current frameworks for evaluating restrictive
covenants fail to adequately consider the restrictive covenant's impact on access to
care for patients in underserved geographic areas. Patients like Amelia who live in
underserved areas will only realize increased access to care if the framework for
evaluating restrictive covenants considers the extent to which the covenant
encourages physicians to practice in underserved geographic areas.
2. The Potential to Undermine Healthcare Reform Goals
Physician non-competes undermine the healthcare reform goal of improving
quality of care when the non-compete disrupts continuity of care and interferes with
an ongoing doctor-patient relationship. Patients without long-term relationships with
their doctors have shorter lifespans and are less health. When a non-compete disrupts
continuity of care, the non-compete undermines quality. For example, Albert may
have a reduced life expectancy because Dr. Smith's non-compete disrupted
continuity of care and essentially severed the long-term doctor-patient relationship.
Similarly, if courts enforce non-competes to interfere with ongoing
doctor-patient relationships, costs to patients will increase. Patients with poor health
caused by disruption in continuity of care will inevitably incur greater costs; these
patients will need more care because they will be less healthy. Moreover, patients
without continuity of care are more likely to visit the emergency room, incurring
greater costs.
Finally, courts that punish a physician for crossing the nebulous line from
fulfilling ethical obligations to notify patients of the physician's departure to
soliciting patients undermine the health care reform goals of: (1) improving quality,
(2) preserving patient choice and access, and (3) controlling costs. A patient who
never learns her doctor is leaving the practice will suffer a disruption of care; in
effect, the patient will be prevented from continuing to receive treatment from her
doctor. Disruption of care undermines quality because patients without an ongoing
doctor-patient relationship are less healthy. Interpreting a non-solicitation clause to
prohibit a physician from contacting her own patients after leaving a practice not
only undermines quality and patient choice and access, but also inevitably increases
patient costs. Without continuity of care, patients incur increased costs because of
more frequent emergency room visits and poorer health outcomes, resulting in an
increased need for costly care.
141 Id. at 271 ("[R]estrictive covenants may help disperse and decentralize physicians by encouraging
them to move to rural or medically underserved areas, depending on the facts of the case.").
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II. THE EXTENT TO WHICH CONTEMPORARY FRAMEWORKS SUPPORT
HEALTHCARE REFORM GOALS
States have adopted two main approaches to determining the enforceability of
covenants restricting physicians. First, most jurisdictions apply some version of the
reasonableness test.142 Second, other jurisdictions make physician non-competes per
se invalid, with varying allowance for liquidated damages clauses.
143 Neither of these
approaches adequately supports all healthcare reform goals.1
44
A. Some Version ofReasonableness
"The overwhelming majority of [] states apply some type of reasonableness
test" to assess the validity of covenants restricting physicians.1
45 States adopting the
reasonableness test adopt one of two approaches. First, states apply the same
reasonableness test to physician restrictive covenants as they apply to covenants in
any other commercial context.1
46 Second, other states apply the reasonableness test
with heightened scrutiny, given the public policy concerns implicated in physician
restrictive covenants.1
47
This Section explores: (1) reasonableness with no heightened scrutiny,
(2) reasonableness with strict scrutiny, and (3) the blue pencil rule whereby courts
enforce only a reasonable version of an overbroad covenant. This Section also
evaluates the extent to which the reasonableness approach supports healthcare
reform and concludes the approach does not adequately support healthcare reform
goals. Rather, the approach undermines quality by interrupting continuity of care,
increasing costs to patients, and limiting patient choice and access. Moreover, the
reasonableness approach fails to encourage providers to contain costs and accept
lower reimbursement coverage.
i. Reasonableness with No Heightened Scrutiny
States adopting the "reasonableness" approach with no heightened scrutiny
expressly recognize the validity of restrictive covenants in medical practices.1
48 In
"reasonableness" jurisdictions, courts begin with the presumption that contracts are
142 See infra Section II.A.
143 See infra Section II.B.
'4 See infra Sections II.A.iv, II.B.ii,
"s Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More, 869 A.2d 884, 896 (N.J. 2005). See generally Ferdinand S. Tinio,
Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contractual Restrictions on Right of Medical Practitioner to
Practice, Incident to Employment Agreement, 62 A.L.R.3d 1014 (2018) (surveying a multitude of cases
throughout the nation applying the reasonableness to physician restrictive covenants).
'
4 
See infra Section II.A.i.
147 See infra Section II.A.ii.
'" E.g., Wichita Clinic, P.A. v. Louis, 185 P.3d 946, 949 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing such a
covenant as valid); Zellner v. Stephen D. Conrad, M.D., P.C., 183 A.D.2d 250, 251, 253-54 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992) (holding that the trial court properly enforced non-compete in ophthalmologist's contract with
medical corporation covenant holder).
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legal.149 The party challenging a contract shoulders the burden of proving the
contract is illegal or violates public policy.s0 When it is reasonably possible to
uphold a contract, the court must do so.'si In "reasonableness" jurisdictions, the most
important public policy is freedom of contract; courts should avoid interfering with
freedom of contract.52 Public policy requires courts to avoid seeking loopholes to
defeat the contract's purpose."' Parties have broad discretion to agree to terms in
contracts, even when the contracts contain restrictive covenants.15 4
Courts adopting the reasonableness approach evaluate physician non-competes
no differently than other non-competes.1 55 Typically, reasonableness jurisdictions
use the following framework to evaluate the validity of physician non-competes.
Like other contracts, the "covenant must be supported by [adequate]
consideration."56 Next, the covenant "must be ancillary to the contract."'5 7
Then, courts consider the following. First, the covenant must support one or more
legitimate business interests and must not be solely to avoid competition.' Second,
courts consider whether the covenant imposes an undue burden on the physician
covenantor.'5 9 Third, courts consider whether the covenant injures the public.'6
Finally, courts consider whether the covenant's temporal, geographic, and activities
scope is reasonable, considering the particular circumstances.'6 i Below, this Section
explores how various courts have applied this framework and evaluates the extent to
which this framework furthers healthcare reform goals.
1. Valid Consideration and Ancillary Nature of Covenant
In reasonableness jurisdictions, covenant holders have easily proven that
the non-compete was supported by valid consideration and was ancillary to the
overarching contract.162 For example, courts have found adequate consideration for
"' E.g., Nat'l Bank of Andover v. Kansas Bankers Sur. Co., 225 P.3d 707, 715-16 (Kan. 2010);
Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 951.
"'0 Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 951.
151 id
152 Id.; see Marshall v. Covington, 339 P.2d 504, 506 (Idaho 1959).
113 Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 957 (quoting Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 89 (Kan. 1996)).
11s Id. at 95 1.
1 See, e.g., Varney Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Pottroff, 59 P.3d 1003, 1015 (Kan. 2002) (applying the same
test applied in physician non-compete cases in the context of an accounting business); Wichita Clinic, 185
P.3d at 951-52 (analyzing a physician non-compete under the same test as other non-competes).
56 Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 951.
157 id.
15. Weber, 913 P.2d at 89; Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 951-52.
' Weber, 913 P.2d at 90-91; Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 951, 955.
'6 Weber, 913 P.2d at 90, 93-96; Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 951, 955-56.
161 Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 951, 954; see also Weber, 913 P.2d at 90.
162 See, e.g., Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 951-52; Zellner v. Stephen D. Conrad, M.D., P.C., 183
A.D.2d 250, 253-57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that the trial court properly enforced the
non-compete in an ophthalmologist's contract with a medical corporation covenant holder where the
clause was supported by adequate consideration through the corporation's continued employment of the
ophthalmologist upon execution of the contract); Ladd v. Hikes, 639 P.2d 1307, 1309-10 (Or. Ct App.
1982) (holding that the trial court erred in denying an injunction for a medical associate's breach of a
non-compete where the associate "walked into a ready-made practice at a guaranteed salary without the
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a restrictive covenant in an employment agreement when the physician-employee
promised to furnish medical services for the employer covenant holder, and the
covenant holder promised to pay the physician.'
63 Moreover, courts have concluded
that a restrictive covenant was ancillary to an employment contract where the
covenant holder agreed to employ the physician in exchange for the physician's
agreement to the restrictive covenant.'" Because the overarching purpose was to
protect against unfair competition, courts have found the restrictive covenant was
ancillary to the overarching employment contract.
16 5
2. Legitimate Business Interests
To be valid, the restrictive covenant must support one or more legitimate business
interests.166 If the only "purpose is to avoid ordinary competition," the restrictive
covenant is unenforceable.167 Courts have found that covenant holders have
legitimate business interests to protect the following: the patient base, training of
physicians, trade secrets, confidential business information, goodwill, reputation,
and patient referral sources.
168 Courts adopting the reasonableness approach have
determined that patient referral sources were a legitimate business interest because
the relationships a covenant holder developed during the departing physician's
employment belong to the covenant holder employer, not the departing physician.
69
Reasonableness courts have recognized patient base as a legitimate business
interest and have enforced covenants to disrupt the doctor-patient relationship.'
70
Despite the importance of continuity of care, courts have found longer-term
doctor-patient relationships, such as relationships between family practice doctors
and patients, provide even more support for covenant enforcement.
1 7 ' For example,
in Wichita Clinic, P.A. v. Louis, the court held that the loss of family practice patients,
where there is a longer-term relationship, was an even more legitimate business
interest supporting covenant enforcement han in specialties, such as heart surgery,
[need] of expending any money for office space, employees, equipment, [or] liability insurance").
161 Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 951-52; see Zellner, 183 A.D.2d at 254-56; Ladd, 639 P.2d at 1308-09.
'" Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 952; see Ladd, 639 P.2d at 1311.
161 Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 952, 954; see Zellner, 183 A.D.2d at 254-55.
'66 Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 951.
167 Id. at 952 (quoting Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 89 (Kan. 1996)).
6
1 Id at 952-53 ("Our Supreme Court has recognized that an employer has a legitimate business interest to
protect in the following areas: customer contacts, special training of employees, trade secrets, confidential business
information, loss of clients, goodwill, reputation, refenal sources, and preserving contact with clients."); KATHERINE
BENESCH, UPDATE ON COVENANTS NOT To COMPETE: WILL THEY SURVIVE IN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY?
(2006), http//archivehealthlawyers.org/google/health law archive/programp 2/2006IHHSbeneschpdf
[https//perma.cc/UJR5-5PGM] (surveying statutory and case law concerning physician restrictive covenants and
citing investment in the physician's training, paying for training and insurance, specialized training, goodwill
consisting of existing patient relationships and reputation, patient referral base and the investment needed
to generate goodwill, protection of hospital referral sources, and confidential information pertaining to
past and present patients as legitimate business interests supporting restrictive covenants).
169 E.g., Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 953 (citing Idbeis v. Wichita Surgical Specialists, P.A., 112 P.3d
81, 90 (Kan. 2005)).
70 See, e.g., id. at 952-53 (citing Weber, 913 P.2d at 91-92).
17, See, e.g., id. at 953 (citing Wichita Clinic, P.A. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 45 F. Supp.
2d 1164, 1182-83 (D. Kan. 1999)).
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where patients are transient.172 The court concluded that the clinic had legitimate
business interests in its patient base, referral sources, and goodwill to support
non-compete enforcement.17 3 Recognizing this valid interest, the clinic director
testified that the non-compete's purpose was to protect the clinic from doctors
leaving and taking patients.174 The court enforced the non-compete75 and disrupted
the long-term relationships the doctor had with her family practice patients.
3. Undue Burden on Physician
Even though many courts in reasonableness jurisdictions ostensibly consider the
burden imposed on the physician, this factor rarely justifies refusal to enforce the
covenant.176 For example, in Wichita Clinic, the appellate court determined that the
covenant did not impose an undue burden on the physician, despite the lower court's
finding that the covenant unduly burdened the physician because of its three-year
term even though "most restrictive covenants were only for [two] years."7 7 The
covenant gave the doctor the option to pay liquidated damages and continue
practicing in the covered area or refrain from practicing in the covered area for three
years.78 The appellate court decided that the covenant was not unduly burdensome
because the "covenant did not entirely prevent [the doctor] from practicing as a
family practice physician.""'
Moreover, some jurisdictions statutorily prohibit courts from considering the
burden imposed on the physician. In Florida, for instance, courts cannot refuse to
enforce a covenant based on the burden on the physician.' Florida's restrictive
covenant statute states, "[i]n determining the enforceability of a restrictive covenant,
a court: [s]hall not consider any individualized economic or other hardship that might
be caused to the person against whom enforcement is sought."'
172 id.
1' Id. at 954.
17 id.
"s Id. at 949.
176 See, e.g., id. at 951, 955. See also Koons, supra note 140 ("Although the traditional formulation
of the rule [of reason] requires courts to consider all three factors (i.e., employer's interests, hardship on
the employee, and injury to the public), most courts consider only whether the covenant seeks to protect
some legitimate business interest, almost to the exclusion of the other two factors."); Malloy, supra note
5 (stating "[w]hen considering the reasonableness of the physician restrictive covenant, courts fail to
recognize that most physicians are relatively immobile in terms of state licensing and practice area" and
that "[c]ourts often opine that physicians are not restricted from practicing all medicine, only that which
they were practicing for the contracted employer"); see also id. at 196 n.35 ("To show a restrictive
covenant is unduly burdensome, a physician must show the agreement imposes some severe and unique
personal hardship." (citing Lewis v. Surgery & Gynecology, Inc., No. 90AP-300, 1991 WL 35010, at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1991) as an example of such rare, special hardship where a court found restrictive
covenant enforcement would impose undue burden on the physician by forcing her to relocate her
developmentally disabled child from her special school)).
."Id. at 955.
" Id at 952.
179 id.
1so See FLA. STAT. § 54 2 .33 5(1)(g)(1) (West 2018).
1" Id.
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4. Injury to the Public
Although courts in reasonableness jurisdictions ostensibly consider injury to the
public, they often ignore the negative impact covenant enforcement has on continuity
of care.'82 For example, in Wichita Clinic, the court found that the three year
non-compete did not unduly injure the public because: "(1) [] there were a number
of family practice physicians [in the covered area]; (2) [] the [covenant holder] Clunc
would have absorbed [the physician's] patients, and (3) [ the patients were not
prevented from having quality medical care."'
83 The physician could not continue to
treat her patients unless she violated the restrictive covenant the court determined
was enforceable.' 8
Despite the importance of long-term relationships between family practice
doctors and patients, courts like Wichita Clinic are more likely to enforce covenants
against family practice doctors than those against specialists; the covenant holder
clinic has a stronger business interest in the long-term relationships family practice
doctors have with their patients.' Moreover, there is often no shortage of family
practice doctors in a given geographic area.' Allowing covenant enforcement to
sever the long-term doctor-patient relationship between family practice doctors and
patients, however, disrupts continuity of care and negatively impacts quality of
care.'18 This is one reason why the AMA has stated that non-competes can disrupt
continuity of care and should be unenforceable if they fail to make reasonable
accommodation of patients' choice of physician.
88
Courts have ignored the negative impact disrupting the doctor-patient
relationship has on quality of care, instead focusing only on whether there is a
shortage of doctors in the relevant practice area in the covered area.'
8 9 Therefore, it
is often more difficult to enforce non-competes against specialists for which there is
a shortage in the covered area.'
9 o Even if there is a shortage of specialists in the area,
however, courts have still enforced restrictive covenants limiting the physician's
ability to practice in the area. For example, in Foltz v. Struxness, the court enforced
182 Klimkina, supra note 15, at 147-48, 154 (arguing that "when restrictive covenants are upheld
[against] physicians, the patients take the hardest hit").
' Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 952, 955 (agreeing with the above-mentioned trial court's findings as
to injury to the public and reevaluating the issue of whether the restrictive covenant was unreasonable and
unenforceable).
'" See id. at 962-63.
.. Id. at 953-54.
186 See id at 954 (recognizing the practice area as "competitive"); id at 955-56 (comparing the case to one in
which the noncompete was upheld on the basis that there were a sufficient number of doctors in the area).
11 See id. at 955; Klimkina, supra note 15, at 147-49, 154.
i8 Klimkina, supra note 15, at 147-48.
"9 See, e.g., Wichita Clinic, 185 P.3d at 955-56 (concluding that patients would not be prevented
from receiving quality care if a physician were unable to practice in a particular area).
'90 See Berg, supra note 7, at 29-30 (asserting courts have recognized restrictive covenants
concerning physicians injure the public if covenant enforcement will lead to a shortage of relevant
specialty physicians and citing Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic v. Petrozza, 373 S.E.2d 449 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1988) in which the court found the covenant unenforceable after determining that the community's
need for a sufficient number of gastroenterologists outweighed freedom of contract); Andrews, supra note
3 (stating that courts may consider whether enforcing a non-compete would produce "a physician shortage
in a particular region or specialty").
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the non-compete based on the trial court's finding that the covered area was "no more
in need of further doctors and surgeons than many other [similar] communities."'91
5. Reasonableness in Time, Place, and Activities
Reasonableness courts have enforced covenants that were quite broad in
temporal, geographic, and activities scopes. As to temporal scope, most courts hold
as reasonable physician restrictive covenants lasting between two and five years but
decline to enforce restrictive covenants that are unlimited.1 92 Generally, to be
reasonable, the covenant should be no longer than necessary for the employer to hire
a replacement and for that person "to have a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate"
her effectiveness to patients.'93 Courts have, however, allowed for covenants of a
longer duration. For example, in Foltz, the court upheld a non-compete that restricted
the physician from practicing medicine within 100 miles of the covenant holder
clinic for ten years from the date the agreement was signed.'94 When the physician
terminated his employment, there were over eight years remaining on the
covenant.95 Although 100 miles from the clinic was overly broad, the court excused
the covenant holder's overreaching.'96 Instead, the court fulfilled its duty to uphold
the principle of freedom of contract, rewrote the covenant to reduce the radius to five
miles, and upheld the covenant.197
In reasonableness jurisdictions, physician non-competes need be no narrower
than non-competes outside the healthcare sector.'98 For example, one appellate court
overturned a lower court's finding that the three-year covenant scope was overly
broad.'99 The appellate court found that although two years was common for
non-competes generally, a covenant running beyond two years was not necessarily
unreasonable.2 0 The appellate court failed to recognize that two years was standard
outside of the healthcare context where public policy issues like continuity of care
and patient choice were not implicated. Despite the policy issues in the healthcare
context and the lower court's temporally overbroad finding, the appellate court found
the three-year covenant reasonable.20' The appellate court took seriously its burden
to avoid "seeking loopholes . .. [to] defeat[] the contract's intended purpose. "202
Reasonableness courts enforce covenants with broad geographic coverage as
well.203 For example, one court cited precedent upholding geographically broad
191 Foltz v. Struxness, 215 P.2d 133, 139 (Kan. 1950).
192 Berg, supra note 7, at 25-26.
'
9 Id. at 24-25.
194 Foltz, 215 P.2d at 135, 140.
1 Id. at 135-36 (explaining the physician entered the ten-year covenant on December 29, 1947 and
left on March 2, 1949).
19 See id at 137-38.
" See id. at 137.
'9 See, e.g., Wichita Clinic, P.A. v. Louis, 185 P.3d 946, 951-52 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (analyzing a
physician non-compete under the same test as other non-competes).
'9 Id. at 954-55.
200 Id. at 955.
201 id.
202 
Id. at 951.
203 See, e.g., id. at 955 (citing E. Distrib. Co. v. Flynn, 567 P.2d 1371 (Kan. 1977)).
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covenants outside the healthcare sector to conclude the physician covenant was
geographically reasonable.20 The court failed to recognize that public policy
considerations such as patient choice, continuity of care, and quality of care warrant
stricter scrutiny of the geographic scope of physician covenants. In reasonableness
jurisdictions, the covenant's protection need only be "coextensive with the area from
which the [c]linic drew most of its patients."
2 05
ii. Reasonableness with Strict Scrutiny
Several state courts have developed an intermediate approach, applying the
traditional framework but more strictly scrutinizing physician restrictive
covenants.2 06 Strict scrutiny gives greater attention to public policy concerns, such
as continuity of care, quality of care, and patient choice.
2 07 Courts applying strict
scrutiny apply a more exacting review for the analysis of all the elements of the
traditional framework.2 08 Such courts strictly scrutinize whether the restrictive
covenant truly serves an employer's identified legitimate interests.
209 Moreover,
courts strictly scrutinize whether the covenant is "narrowly tailored to achieve" the
asserted interests.210 Finally, courts strictly scrutinize whether covenant enforcement
would negatively impact public interests, especially noneconomic interests, such as
the doctor-patient relationship and patient access to care.
21' With strict scrutiny,
employers shoulder a higher burden in justifying the restrictive covenant than
employers shoulder under the traditional framework applied in other economic
sectors.
212
For example, in Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, the Arizona Supreme Court
ruled that physician restrictive covenants should be "strictly construed in favor of
professional mobility" and patient choice and access.
213 The practice's covenant with
the "internist and pulmonologist who . . . treated AIDS and HIV-positive patients
and performed brachytherapy" prohibited the physician from practicing for three
years after termination of employment within a five-mile radius of any office of the
covenant holder practice.214 Strict construction required the court to examine the
204 id
205 Id.
206 Koons, supra note 140, at 261-62.
207 
See id.
208 Id. at 262.
209 id.
210 id.
211 Id.; see also Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277,1282-83, 1285 (Ariz. 1999); Iredell
Digestive Disease Clinic, PA v. Petrozza, 373 S.E.2d 449, 453, 455 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting the
per se rule, holding restrictive covenants unenforceable if it "create[s] a substantial question of potential
harm to the public health," and stating that the court was extremely hesitant to deny the patient her choice
of physician); Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll, 594 N.E.2d 1027, 1031, 1033 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (adopting
the position that physician non-competes were not per se unenforceable but stating that physician
non-competes affected public interest more significantly than other non-competes).
212 Koons, supra note 140, at 262.
213 Valley Med. Specialists, 982 P.2d at 1282-83 (quoting Ohio Urology, Inc., 594 N.E.2d at 1032).
2 14 Id. at 1278-79.
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interests of the practice, physician, patients, and public. 2 15 The doctor-patient
relationship and the patient's freedom to choose her doctor heavily weighed against
any interest the practice might have had in its patient base.216 The court
acknowledged the practice had a protectable interest in referral sources but
determined the covenant was unnecessarily broad to protect that interest.217
Pulmonology "require[d] contact with the treating physician [at least] once every six
months," making any timeframe over six months unnecessary to protect the
practice's interests.2 18 The court held that the activities scope was unreasonably
broad because the covenant restricted all medical care and was not limited to the
covenant holder's specialties.219 As to the public's interest, the court stated that even
assuming other pulmonologists were available in the area, "court[s] must evaluate
the extent to which enforcing the covenant would [preclude] patients from seeing the
departing physician if they [wanted] to do so."22 0 The court "conclud[ed] that
patients' right to see the doctor of their choice" warranted "substantial protection,"
and the practice's interests were "comparatively minimal." 221 The geographic scope
of over 200 square miles was unnecessarily broad because it significantly inhibited
patients' ability to continue treatment with their physician.2 22 Therefore, the court
held the covenant unenforceable and declined to rewrite the covenant to make it
reasonable.223
iii. Blue Pencil Rule
Courts adopting the reasonableness test often use equity powers to "blue pencil"
a restrictive covenant and enforce only a reasonable version of an overbroad
covenant.224 Generally, courts adopt one of two approaches. First, courts use the less
flexible version of the blue pencil rule to scratch out grammatically severable
portions of an overbroad covenant and enforce only the remaining portions. Second,
courts adopt a more flexible approach and enforce only a reasonable version of an
overbroad covenant, regardless of whether grammatical severance is possible.
Under the less flexible version, courts sever some words of the covenant and
leave intact reasonable portions. For example, in Sharvelle, MD., P. C. v. Magnante,
the court used the blue pencil rule to enforce a limited version of the non-solicitation
portion of a covenant but held the blue pencil rule did not support enforcing a limited
version of the non-compete portion.22 5 The non-compete clause prohibited the
ophthalmologist from practicing "health care of every nature and kind" in a specified
21 Id at 1283.
216 Id. at 1284-85.
217 id
2 18 Id. at 1285 (citing and upholding the trial court's findings).
219 Id. at 1285.220
d
221 id.
222 id.
223 Id. at 1286.224 Id. (discussing Arizona precedent of using the "blue pencil" approach, which entails the removal
of "grammatically severable, unreasonable provisions" of a restrictive covenant).
225 Sharvelle v. Magnante, 836 N.E.2d 432, 439-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
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geographic area for two years after leaving the clinic's employment.
2 26 The court
ruled that if a covenant was clearly divisible into reasonable and unreasonable parts,
the blue pencil rule allowed the court to enforce only the reasonable portions.
227 The
court stated that courts cannot add terms that were not originally part of the
agreement but should make unreasonable restraints reasonable by "scratching out
any offensive clauses to give effect to the parties' intentions."
228 The court did not
agree with the clinic's argument that removing the phrase "of every nature and kind"
would make the covenant reasonable. 229 The evidence showed that the
ophthalmologist practiced only eye-related health care.
230 The court found that the
term 'healthcare' "encompass[ed] the spectrum of medical practice, and the phrase
'of every nature and kind' [was] superfluous." 
231 The court concluded that the clinic
did not satisfy its burden to show the circumstances of the ophthalmologist's
employment supported the broad practice description and refused to use the blue
pencil rule to enforce a limited version of the non-compete.
232
The Sharvelle court, however, used the blue pencil rule to "scratch[] out [the]
offensive clauses" and enforce the remainder of the non-solicitation clause.
233 The
non-solicitation clause prohibited the ophthalmologist from "soliciting 'former,
current or future' patients or employees" of the clinic during the scope of the
ophthalmologist's employment and for two years after.
234 The court held that the
non-solicitation clause was overbroad but applied the blue-pencil rule to delete the
terms "former" and "future" and enforce the remainder of the clause.
235 Therefore,
for two years after leaving the clinic, the clause prohibited the ophthalmologist from
soliciting the clinic's current patients or employees.
236
Under the more flexible version, courts enforce a limited version of the covenant,
"regardless of whether a grammatical severance is possible."
237 For example, in
Community Hospital Group, Inc. v. More, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that the geographic scope in a neurosurgeon's non-compete injured the public and
enforced a limited covenant, even though grammatical severance was impossible.
23
1
The non-compete prohibited the neurosurgeon from practicing medicine within a
thirty-mile radius of the hospital for two years after employment.
23 9 The court
considered whether there was a shortage of neurosurgeons in the area and examined
whether enforcement would disrupt continuity of care.
24 If enforcement restricted
226 Id. at 434, 437.227 
Id. at 439.
228 Id. (quoting Burk v. Heritage Food Serv. Equip., 737 N.E.2d 803, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).
229 id.
230 Id. at 437-38.
231 Id. at 439.
232 Id. at 438-39.
233 Id. at 439-40.
234 Id. at 440.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 608-09 (7th ed. 2014).
238 See Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More, 869 A.2d 884, 900 (N.J. 2005); see also PERILLO, supra note
237, at 608 n.277.
239 Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc., 869 A.2d at 887-88.
240 Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc., 869 A.2d at 898-900.
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the neurosurgeon's current patients from receiving treatment from the neurosurgeon
at his new location, the geographic scope should be limited "in light of the number
of patients who would be so restricted."241 Enforcing the thirty-mile radius would
injure the public because there was a shortage of neurosurgeons in the area.242 The
geographic scope compromised the neurosurgeon's ability to treat emergency room
patients in a designated city as well as patients who could not travel beyond the
thirty-mile radius.243 The court stated that "courts should not hesitate to partially
enforce [] restrictive covenant[s]."2" Remanding, the court instructed the lower court
"to determine the precise limits of the geographic" scope while: (1) avoiding
exceeding thirteen miles and (2) excluding the designated city.245
iv. Extent to Which the Reasonableness Approach Supports
Healthcare Reform Goals
The reasonableness approach undermines patient choice and access because
reasonableness courts often disrupt continuity of care.246 Because courts applying
reasonableness treat physician restrictive covenants no differently than other
restrictive covenants, these courts value freedom of contract over patient choice and
access.247 Reasonableness courts recognize the patient base as a legitimate business
interest and fail to give sufficient weight to continuity of care and the doctor-patient
relationship.248 This is why courts such as the Dental East court enforced a covenant
prohibiting a dentist from treating his own patients or even notifying his own patients
of his departure, essentially severing the doctor-patient relationship.249
Because the reasonableness approach disrupts continuity of care, the approach
undermines quality of care.25 0 When courts enforce non-competes against family
practice doctors because the covenant holder clinic has a strong interest in long-term
patient relationships, like in Wichita Clinic, courts harm patients.251 Disrupting
continuity of care, particularly for long-term conditions, shortens patients' lifespans
and produces poorer outcomes.252 Therefore, the reasonableness approach
undermines quality.
Considering the reasonableness approach allows covenant holders to protect their
investment in the physician, the reasonableness approach has the potential to contain
241 Id. at 898 (quoting Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1170 (N.J. 1978)).
242 Id. at 899-900.
243 Id. at 899.
244Id. at 900.
245 d2
1 See supra Section II.A.i.4.
247 See supra Section II.A.i,
24 See supra Section II.A.i.2; see also Berg, supra note 7, at 48 (asserting that at best physician
non-competes interfere with patient access to care by their physician of choice in a convenient location
and at worst non-competes "completely supplant" the patient's ability to maintain the doctor-patient
relationship with the departing physician and that research indicates continuity of care yields benefits to
patients and society and therefore physician non-competes should be unenforceable).
249 See supra Section I.A.
250 See supra Section I.C.ii.
251 See supra Section II.A.i.4.
252 See supra Section I.C.iv.2.
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patient costs.253 The reasonableness framework, however, fails to ensure that patients
realize cost containment.25 4 Theoretically, a clinic's ability to protect its investment
ensures that the clinic can recoup unexpected losses when a physician leaves the
clinic's practice and sets up a competing practice.
255 Even better, the clinic can enjoin
the physician from setting up the competing practice.
256 Protecting against
unexpected economic losses could enable the clinic to: (1) control patient costs and
(2) accept lower reimbursement coverage such as TRICARE, Medicaid, and
Medicare. The reasonableness framework, however, fails to make covenant
enforcement turn on the extent to which the covenant holder uses the covenant to
protect its investment so that it can accept lower reimbursement coverage and contain
patient costs. The reasonableness approach fails to contain costs for patients;
reasonableness only contains costs for the covenant holder.
Reasonableness jurisdictions blue pencil restrictive covenants, undermining
quality of care, patient choice and access, and cost containment;
257 rewrtig
covenants encourages covenant holders to craft overreaching covenants.
25 8 For every
overreaching non-compete a physician contests, there are many more overreaching
non-competes with which physicians comply.
259 When the doctor-patient
relationship and continuity of care are at stake, courts should not save covenant
holders who draft overreaching covenants. Jurisdictions like Florida that mandate
blue penciling260 encourage overreaching. This overreaching burdens departing
physicians and adversely impacts patient choice and access and quality of care for
patients like Albert who must search for a new physician because of his physician's
non-compete. Disruption of care will negatively impact Albert's health.
26
1 Moreover,
overreaching covenants undermine competition in the healthcare marketplace, and
competition helps control costs.
262 Therefore, blue penciling undermines quality of
care, patient choice and access, and cost containment.
Although strict scrutiny better protects patient choice and access and quality
of care by placing higher value on these public policy issues, strict scrutiny is nothing
253 See supra Sections I.C.iii, II.A.i.2.
25 See supra Section I.C.iv.2.
255 See Koons, supra note 140, at 270-71.
256 Id. at 286-87 (recognizing that injunctive reliefwill more significantly impact the public's interest
in having the physician's services available and the patient's interest in freely choosing a physician and
that "courts should weigh a request for injunctive relief in favor of refusing [] enforce[ment] [of] a
restrictive covenant," but this is often not the case in reasonableness jurisdictions).
257 See supra Section II.A.iii.
258 Kenneth R. Swift, Void Agreements, Knocked-out Terms, and Blue Pencils: Judicial and
Legislative Handling of Unreasonable Terms in Noncompete Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
223, 254 (2007) (asserting that "the rewrit(ing] approach does nothing to discourage employers from
seeking the broadest possible protections . . . because the employer can rely on the court to rein in any
excesses").
"
9 Id at 246-47 (quoting Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV.
625, 682 (1960).
260 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West 2019) ("[A] court shall modify the restraint and grant only the
relief reasonably necessary to protect such interest or interests.").
261 See supra Section I.C.ii.
262 See Koons, supra note 140, at 262 (acknowledging the "importance of competition in physician
services in times of skyrocketing health care costs").
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more than the reasonableness framework with a more exacting review.263 Therefore,
strict scrutiny, like reasonableness, asks the wrong questions and fails to evaluate the
covenant's impact on healthcare reform goals. Strict scrutiny is not designed to
support healthcare reform and therefore fails to: (1) adequately safeguard the
doctor-patient relationship and continuity of care and (2) provide transactional
incentives to contain costs to patients and expand access to underserved populations.
B. Per Se Invalidity with Varying Allowance for Liquidated Damages
This Section surveys jurisdictions adopting a per se invalidity approach to
physician non-competes and analyzes the extent to which the per se invalidity
approach supports or undermines healthcare reform goals. The Section posits that
per se invalidity misses an opportunity to incentivize expansion of patient choice and
access and cost containment.
i. Survey of Jurisdictions Adopting the Per Se Invalidity Approach
New Hampshire,26 Delaware,265 Colorado,266 and Massachusetts267 statutorily
prohibit physician non-competes which restrict a physician's right to practice in a
designated geographic location for a specified period of time. These states prohibit
enjoining the physician's practice pursuant to a restrictive covenant. These states,
however, vary in the extent to which they allow contractual provisions providing for
damages from injury resulting from breach of a restrictive covenant.
Although the Delaware statute ostensibly prohibits non-competes which restrict
the right of a physician to practice, the statute allows contractual provisions requiring
a physician to pay damages reasonably related to the harm the covenant holder
suffered because of the physician's termination of the agreement, including
"damages related to competition."268 For example, in Palekar v. Batra, the court held
that even though Delaware prohibits restrictive covenants from enjoining a physician
from practicing medicine, "[1]iquidated damages provisions are presumptively
valid."269 The party challenging the liquidated damages provision shouldered the
burden of proof. 270
To determine the validity of the liquidated damages provision, the Delaware
court applied a two-part test.271 First, the damages must be "difficult to ascertain."272
Second, the stipulated amount must either be a "reasonable estimate" of damages a
breach would likely cause or be "reasonably proportionate" to damages the covenant
263 See supra Section II.A.ii.
264 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:31-a (2016).
265 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707 (2019).
266 COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2018).
267 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12X (2019).
268 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707 (2019).
269 Palekar v. Batra, No. 08C-10-269-JOH, 2010 WL 2501517, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. May 18, 2010).
270 Id at *8
271 Id. at *6.
272 Id. at *6-7 (quoting S.H. Deliveries, Inc. v. Tristate Courier & Carriage, Inc., No. 96C-02-086-
WTQ, 1997 WL 817883, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. May 21, 1997)).
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holder actually suffered.273 When applying the first prong, the court deferred to the
contract language.2 74 In Batra, the contract stated that "actual damages would be
difficult to calculate."275 Then, the contract required the physician to pay $200,000
in liquidated damages if the physician practiced within a twenty-mile radius of the
covenant holder's sites within two years of terminating his employment.
276 The court
refused to "look backward" to evaluate the amount of profits the physician "allegedly
diverted from the [p]ractice" to create a more "certain and concrete amount of
damages."277 Harm resulting from lost patients was not amenable to precise
estimation.27 Therefore, the court determined that the first prong--requiring
damages to be difficult to ascertain-was met as a matter of law.
279
Applying the second prong, which requires the stipulated amount to be either a
reasonable estimate or proportionate to damages actually suffered, the Delaware
court held that the stipulated amount was reasonable as a matter of law.
280 The
physician argued that $200,000 in liquidated damages was unreasonable because the
physician was extremely profitable when he worked for the covenant holder.
28
1
Moreover, the physician urged the court to require the covenant holder to justify the
$200,000 amount and explain how the practice suffered that amount in damages.
282
The court rejected both of the physician's arguments.
283 First, the large revenue the
physician brought to the practice actually supported the reasonableness of the
$200,000 fixed amount.284 Second, even if the practice actually suffered far less
damages than $200,000, the liquidated damages provision was valid because the
fixed amount was a reasonable estimate at the time of the contract's formation.
2 85
273 Id. (quoting S.H. Deliveries, Inc., 1997 WL 817883, at *8).
274 Id. at *7.
275 id.
276 Id. at *2.
277 Id. at *7.
278 Id. (quoting Faw Casson & Co. v. Halpen, No. OOC-01-015, 2001 WL 958104, at *5 (Del. Super.
Ct. Aug. 7, 2001).
279 Id.
280id.
281 id.
282 id.
283 Id. at *78
284 Id. at *8.
285 Id; In Christiana Medical Group, P.A. v. Ford, the court stated that liquidated damages were
presumptively valid. Christina Med. Grp., P.A. v. Ford, No. 06C-07-033, 2008 WL 162829, at *4 (Del.
Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2008). To determine whether a clause was an invalid penalty or a valid liquidated
damages clause, the court applied a two-part test. Id First, at the time of contract formation, it must 
have
been "difficult to ascertain" damages. Id. Second, the stipulated amount must be either a "reasonable
estimate" of damages a breach would likely cause, or be "reasonably proportionate" to damages the
covenant holder actually suffered. Id. "If the amount is a reasonable estimate of the damages [the covenant
holder would likely suffer], the provision is valid, even if the [designated amount is] substantially larger
than the actual damages sustained." Id. In Christiana Medical Group, the covenant required the physician
to pay $100,000 in liquidated damages if the physician practiced in designated hospitals within one year
of terminating employment. Id. at * 1. The physician practiced in the designated hospitals within a year of
terminating his employment. Id. at * 1-2. The court could not determine as a matter of law whether the
clause was valid but left that factual issue to the factfinder. Id. at *4.
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The Colorado statute286 mirrors the Delaware statute.287 Just as in Delaware,
Colorado invalidates physician non-competes that restrict physicians from practice
but allows provisions requiring damages from a physician's breach.288 Plaintiffs,
however, shoulder a greater burden to justify liquidated damages in Colorado than
they do in Delaware. For example, in Crocker v. Greater Colorado Anesthesia, the
court held that "[a]ny damages awarded ... must be reasonably related to the injury
actually suffered and not simply related to an injury prospectively estimated at the
time of contract formation."289 Rather, courts could conduct the reasonableness
assessment only upon an agreement's termination.290 The damages amount had to be
"reasonably related to 'the injury suffered,' in the past tense."291 The agreement
provided that if the physician competed with the covenant holder by practicing
anesthesia within fifteen miles of the covenant holder's hospital within two years of
leaving the practice, the physician would be liable for liquidated damages as
calculated by a specified formula.292 The covenant holder "did not present evidence
of [] losses."29 3 The Crocker court found "no reasonable relationship" between the
injury suffered and the $200,000 calculated under the formula.294 Further, the
Crocker court found the liquidated damages clause invalid because the covenant
holder offered no evidence that the amount the formula produced was "reasonably
related to [the] injury suffered."2 95
Therefore, even though Delaware and Colorado adopted the same statutory
language, Delaware covenant holders stand a better chance of enforcing liquidated
damages provisions. In Delaware, liquidated damages provisions are presumptively
valid; courts defer to contract language stating damages were difficult to estimate. In
Colorado, damages have to be reasonably related to the injury suffered, in the past
tense. Covenant holders must present evidence to explain why the amount the clause
fixed or produced through a specified formula reasonably related to the injury
actually suffered.
In Massachusetts, it is extremely difficult for a covenant holder to enforce a
contractual provision for damages suffered because of a physician's breach of a
non-compete. Massachusetts courts have refused to enforce contractual provisions
for damages for competing with a covenant holder, even when the damages
correspond to ascertainable debts incurred in setting up a practice.296 Unlike the
Delaware and Colorado statutes, the Massachusetts law does not expressly allow
contractual provisions requiring payment of damages for competition. Rather,
286 COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2018).
287 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707 (2019).
288 Compare id., with COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2018).
289 Crocker v. Greater Colorado Anesthesia, No. 17CA0099, 2018 WL 1247618, at *3 (Colo. App.
Mar. 8,2018).
290 Id. at *6.
291 Id. (interpreting COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2018)).
292 Id. at *3.
293 Id. at *5.
294 Id. at *6.
295 id
296 E.g., MetroWest Med. Grp., Inc. v. Mount Auburn Hosp., No. 94-4767, 1994 WL 902895, at *4
(Mass. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1994).
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Massachusetts "prohibits the imposition of a covenant not to compete on a physician
who leaves an established practice. "297
For example, in Falmouth Ob-Gyn Associates, Inc. v. Abisla, the court held the
"compensation for competition" clause violated Massachusetts physician
non-compete law because it imposed the same "inhibitory effect" as that posed by
an "absolute bar" on a physician's ability to practice.
298 The covenant required the
obstetrician to pay $250,000 in liquidated damages if he practiced within twenty-five
miles of designated counties within two years of terminating employment.
299 The
employer argued that $250,000 represented a valid amount for liquidated damages,
even though the figure did not correspond to ascertainable financial costs the
employer actually incurred.00 The employer argued that Massachusetts law did not
prohibit "compensation for competition" clauses because such clauses did not bar a
physician's practice; according to the employer, $250,000 reasonably approximated
the employer's loss of goodwill "where actual damages [were] difficult to
ascertain."30' The court rejected the employer's arguments.
30 2 Even though a
"compensation for competition" clause did not "absolute[ly] bar" the obstetrician's
ability to practice, requiring liquidated damages imposed the same inhibitory
effect.303
In Parikh v. Franklin Medical Center, the court held that "forfeiture" and
"resignation" clauses "produce[d] . . . an 'inhibitory effect' similar to [the]
'compensation' clause" in Falmouth and violated Massachusetts law.
30" The
partnership agreement's "forfeiture" clause required the anesthesiologist leaving the
practice to forfeit 10% of his partnership income to the other anesthesiologist if the
departing anesthesiologist practiced in competition with the partnership in the
designated county.30 The partnership agreement's "resignation" clause required the
departing anesthesiologist o resign his staff privileges at the designated county's
hospital if he terminated the partnership agreement.
306 The court reasoned that
whether a clause "demands compensation or shuts off a future source of income for
choosing to compete, it clearly transgresses [section] 12X's policy of putting public
choice over freedom of contract."
307
Finally, courts have interpreted Massachusetts law to void clauses allowing
for damages corresponding to ascertainable debts incurred in setting up the departing
physicians' practice with the covenant holder.
308 In Metro West Medical Group, Inc.
21 Parikh v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 940 F. Supp. 395, 408 (D. Mass. 1996) (quoting Falmouth Ob-Gyn
Assocs., Inc. v. Abisla, 629 N.E.2d 291, 292 (Mass. 1994)).
298 Falmouth Ob-Gyn Assocs., Inc., 629 N.E.2d at 293.
299 Id. at 292.
son Id
301 Id.
302 Id. at 292-93.
303 Id. at 293.
'0 Parikh v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 940 F. Supp. 395,408 (D. Mass. 1996) (citing Falmouth, 629 N.E.2d at 293).
'os Id. at 399.
06 Id. at 408.
3o7 Id (citing Falmouth, 629 N.E.2d at 294).
308 MetroWest Med. Grp., Inc. v. Mount Auburn Hosp., No. 94-4767, 1994 WL 902895, at *4 (Mass.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1994).
Vol. 108142
PHYSICIAN RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
v. Mount Auburn Hospital, an "assumption of debt provision" obligated physicians
leaving the covenant holder's practice to repay a pro rata share of a $2.5 million loan
the covenant holder made to the departing physicians, only if the departing
physicians practiced within fifteen miles of the location of the covenant holder's
practice within three years of terminating their employment.3 ' The covenant holder
argued that the provision was: (1) not a non-compete, (2) corresponded to
ascertainable debts the covenant holder incurred in setting up the departing
physicians' practice, and (3) was distinguishable from the liquidated damages
provisions that the Falmouth court "found to be void." 310 The court acknowledged
that the departing physicians' debt had more of a relationship to ascertainable debts
incurred in setting up the practice and was unlike the liquidated damages clause in
Falmouth."' Nonetheless, the court concluded that the provision created an
"inhibitory effect" on physicians choosing where to set up their new practices.312
Because the "restriction, in the form of a significant and inhibitory repayment
obligation" was "tied only to geographic choice," the provision violated
Massachusetts law."
ii. Extent to Which Per Se Invalidity Supports Healthcare Reform Goals
Per se invalidity fails to control healthcare costs, regardless of whether covenant
holders can collect liquidated damages, because per se invalidity does not consider
the covenant's impact on costs to patients. States like Massachusetts that prohibit
physician non-competes, including damages corresponding to ascertainable debts
incurred in setting up the departing physician's practice with the covenant holder,
contribute to rising costs for patients.314 For example, in Metro West, the court
invalidated the "assumption of debt provision" obligating the departing physicians
to repay a pro rata share of the $2.5 million that the departing physicians borrowed
from the covenant holder practice. 1 5 Because the covenant holder could not recover
on the loan, the covenant holder was likely forced to raise fees to patients to recover
its loss. Similarly, the un-recouped expense could have deterred the covenant holder
from accepting lower reimbursement coverage.
Merely enforcing liquidated damages clauses, however, does not necessarily help
control patients' costs and could result in raising patients' costs in a given
community. For example, Delaware courts enforce presumptively valid liquidated
damages provisions, even if the damages do not correlate to losses the covenant
holder actually suffered.316 Unlike the Massachusetts covenant holder in Metro West,
Delaware covenant holders need not raise fees to patients to recover losses suffered
from un-recouped investment in physicians who leave to set up competing practices
'1o Id. at *3.
31" Id. at *4.
312 d
31 id.
314 See supra Section II.B.i.
315 Metro West, 1994 WL 902895, at *4.
311 See supra Section II.B.i.
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because covenant holders can protect their investment with liquidated damages
clauses.
317
But states like Delaware fail to ensure patients realize cost containment because
these states fail to incentivize practices to control patients' costs and increase access
to patients with lower reimbursement coverage. For example, the Palekar v. Batra
court enforced the $200,000 liquidated damages clause, even though the covenant
holder may have actually suffered far less damages than $200,000. 18 Such liquidated
damages provisions have an inhibitory effect on a physician's choice of where to
practice.
The Delaware court failed to consider whether the departing physician intended
to offer more affordable fee-for-service care to area patients than the covenant holder
offered. The court also failed to evaluate whether the departing physician intended
to accept lower reimbursement coverage. Such an inquiry was outside of the
Delaware framework for evaluating physician non-competes. Liquidated damages
clauses potentially inhibit departing physicians from setting up area practices
offering more affordable care and accepting lower reimbursement coverage. Such
competing practices not only bring more affordable care but increase competition in
the community and drive down patient costs, incentivizing competing practices to
reduce fees to attract patients."' Blindly enforcing liquidated damages clauses,
without considering whether covenant enforcement, in the circumstances, will
preclude a doctor from setting up a competing practice offering more affordable care
and expanding access to underserved populations, undermines healthcare reform
goals.
II. MODEL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING PHYSICIAN
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
This Section sets forth a framework for evaluating physician restrictive covenants
that supports the healthcare reform goals. Section 11(A) describes Texas's unique
approach and posits that although Texas better supports healthcare reform goals than
the other contemporary frameworks, Texas could do more. Section 1II(B) articulates
the model framework and articulates model statutory language that provides
transactional incentives to reduce patient costs and expand patient choice and access
by making covenant enforcement turn on the extent to which the covenant furthers
healthcare reform goals.
A. The Unique Approach in Texas
A Texas statute attempts to ensure physician non-competes do not disrupt
continuity of care.32 0 Under the Texas statute, a physician non-compete is
317 See supra Section II.B.i.
311 Palekar v. Batra, No. 08C-10-269-JOH, 2010 WL 2501517, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. May 18, 2010).
3 See Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll, 594 N.E.2d 1027, 1030-32 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (stating that
restrictive covenants implicate public policy concerns such as the importance of competition in physician
services, especially in times of skyrocketing health care costs for patients).320See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West 2009).
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unenforceable if it denies the covered physician access to a list of patients whom the
physician has treated within one year of terminating employment with the covenant
holder.321 Moreover, the non-compete must clarify that the physician is not
prohibited from continuing care "to a specific patient ... during the course of an
acute illness even after the ... [physician's] employment [with the covenant holder]
has been terminated."322 Finally, the non-compete must allow "for a buy out of the
covenant by the physician at a reasonable price."3 23
i. The Texas Approach Better Supports Healthcare Reform Goals than
Other Contemporary Frameworks Do
The Texas statute better supports healthcare reform goals than other contemporary
frameworks do. As compared to the reasonableness approach, in which courts
enforce covenants to disrupt ongoing doctor-patient relationships, Texas attempts to
safeguard continuity of care and protect quality by clarifying that a physician is not
prohibited from continuing care to a patient during an acute illness, even after the
physician's employment has terminated.3 24 Texas's attempt to protect the
doctor-patient relationship preserves patient choice and access better than the
reasonableness approach where courts like Wichita Clinic, P.A. v. Louis enforce
non-competes even though enforcement results in disruption of the doctor-patient
relationship.3 25 Moreover, Texas's requirement for covenants to have buyout
provisions, instead of authorizing injunctions, helps to ensure that physicians can
practice in the covered area, if financially able, and therefore better protects patient
choice and access.32 6
Next, Texas helps control costs more than per se invalidity because Texas allows
clinics to protect investment in new doctors.3 27 For example, unlike Massachusetts,
Texas enforces damages clauses corresponding to ascertainable debts incurred in
setting up the departing physician's practice with the covenant holder.328 Because
the covenant holder can recover on its investment, the covenant holder is not forced
to raise fees to patients to recoup its investment in the departing physician.
ii. The Texas Approach Could Do More to Support Healthcare Reform Goals
The Texas approach, however, should do more to support healthcare reform
goals. First, Texas fails to consider whether the covenant holder or the covered
physician accepts lower reimbursement coverage such as TRICARE, Medicare, and
Medicaid and misses an opportunity to expand patient choice and access.
321 
Id § 15.50(bX)(A); see alSo Andrews, supra note 3 (asserting that, in Texas, "a non-compete [] must allow
doctors to have access to a list of their patients in the past year and access to [those patients'] medical records").322 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(b)(3) (emphasis added).
3 23 Id. § 15.50(b)(2).
324 Id. § 15.50(b)(3).325 Compare id § 15.50(b), with Wichita Clinic, PA. v. Louis, 185 P.3d 946,962-63 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).326 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(b)(2).32 7 
See id. § 15.50.
328 Compare id. § 15.50(b)(2), with MetroWest Med. Grp., Inc. v. Mount Auburn Hosp., No. 94-4767,
1994 WL 902895, at *4 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1994).
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Second, the Texas approach misses an opportunity to protect quality of care
because it fails to prohibit a restrictive covenant from disrupting any doctor-patient
relationship. The Texas statute only requires that a restrictive covenant provide that
a "physician will not be prohibited from providing continuing care and treatment 
to
a specific patient or patients during the course of an acute illness," even after
employment has ended.
329 Continuity of care, however, is more critical for long-term
illnesses and conditions such as diabetes, mental health issues, high cholesterol, and
hypertension.330 The Texas statute fails to protect continuity of care and the
doctor-patient relationship for these long-term conditions.
33 '
B. Model Framework for Evaluating Physician Restrictive Covenants
This Article recommends the following framework for determining the
enforceability of physician restrictive covenants. Statutory language provides clarity
and consistency and reflects the voice of the electorate. Therefore, the optimal
approach is for the state legislature to adopt the framework below. Until that time,
however, this framework should inform a court's decision of whether to enforce a
physician restrictive covenant.
i. Refuse to enforce non-solicitation agreements prohibiting physicians from
soliciting their own patients.
To preserve patient choice and protect quality, states should incentivize doctors
departing a practice to fulfill patient notification responsibilities; states should refuse
to punish doctors for communication with their patients. Courts have held doctors
liable for breach of non-solicitation agreements for attempting to fulfill patient
notification responsibilities and crossing the line into solicitation.3
32 Holding doctors
liable for solicitation when they cross the line between patient notification and
solicitation deters doctors from fulfilling ethical obligations. 
333 To continue care with
her doctor, a patient needs to know: (1) of her doctor's departure from a practice,
(2) the address of the doctor's new practice, (3) of the her right to transfer her care
to her doctor's new practice, and (4) how to transfer.
334 Failure to convey this
information potentially deprives the patient of the choice to remain with her doctor
and disrupts continuity of care.
335
To preserve patient choice and protect quality by avoiding disruption of
continuity of care, courts should refuse to enforce non-solicitation agreements
against physicians who contact their patients after departing a practice. No court
should scrutinize a physician's notification to her patients to determine if the
329 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(b)(3); see also Andrews, supra note 3 ("Continuity of care
is important, doctors say, especially for patients with ongoing medical issues.").
330 See supra Section I.C.ii.
331 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(b)(2).
332 See supra Section I.B.
3 See supra Section I.B.
3 See supra Section I.B.
33 See supra Section I.B.
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physician has crossed the line to solicitation.336 Physician restrictive covenant
regulation should instead encourage physicians to support patients' best interests by
notifying patients when physicians depart."' Doctors should be free to communicate
with their patients, even if the doctor explains the benefits of transferring care to the
doctor's new practice. Refusing to punish doctors for communicating with their
patients: (1) safeguards patient choice, (2) promotes quality of care by safeguarding
continuity of care, and (3) conserves scarce judicial resources. Refraining from
holding doctors liable for communicating with their patients avoids fact-intensive,
expensive litigation requiring courts to scrutinize every word of a departing
physician's notification to her patients.338
ii. Clarify that restrictive covenants can only restrict the location where
a physician practices.
States should clarify that non-competes can only restrict the location where a
physician treats his patients and cannot prohibit a physician from treating patients.3 3 1
Patients like Albert lose their doctors because of their doctors' perceptions of
contractual obligations. Thus, state statutes must clarify that non-competes can only
restrict the location in which a physician practices medicine. For example, the Texas
statute states that a non-compete must clarify "that the physician will not be
prohibited from [] continuing care and treatment to a specific patient or patients
during the course of an acute illness," even after the physician's employment with
the covenant holder has terminated.34 0 The Texas statute fails to prevent restrictive
covenants from disrupting the doctor-patient relationship in many situations.
Continuity of care is even more critical for long-term illnesses and conditions.341 The
Texas statute potentially allows non-compete enforcement that would disrupt
Albert's relationship with Dr. Smith because Albert has had HIV for years; HIV is a
chronic condition, not an acute illness.
Similarly, in Wichita Clinic, the physician could only continue to treat her
patients if she violated a non-compete the court determined enforceable.34 2 Allowing
covenant enforcement to sever the doctor-patient relationship harms patients by
disrupting continuity of care and depriving patients of the choice to continue
treatment with their doctors.343 State statutes should clarify that non-competes are
336 See supra Section I.B.
... See supra Section I.B.
338 See Total Care Physicians, P.A. v. O'Hara, No. Civ.A.99C-11-201-JRS, 2002 WL 31667901, at
*9 (Del. Super. CL Oct. 29, 2002).
3 See supra Section I.A.3 TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(b)(3).
341 Malloy, supra note 5, at 205-06 (indicating that continuity of care has been "linked to increased
utilization of preventative services," which are the types of services that a patient gets from her general
practitioner).
342 See Wichita Clinic, P.A. v. Louis, 185 P.3d 946, 949, 962-63 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (indicating
that the patients could only be treated if the enforceable non-compete was violated).
343 See Steinbuch, supra note 12, at 1054-55 (arguing that physician restrictive covenants reduce
access for patients as "[m]any patients are forced into existing practices and are not offered the
opportunity, when those doctors leave their employment practices, to stay with doctors with whom they
have developed relationships").
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unenforceable if they prohibit a physician from treating patients. Rather,
non-competes can only be enforced to limit the location in which a physician
practices medicine. Given a clear mandate, courts will then refuse to enforce
non-competes that prohibit doctors from treating patients and only enforce
non-competes that limit the location in which doctors practice for a period of time.
Statutory language will inform covenant holders, doctors, patients, and courts that
patients can always travel to continue treatment with their doctors. Doctors, like 
Dr.
Smith, will feel free to continue to treat their patients, like Albert, without fear of
breaching non-competes. Without guidance, covenant holders, like Sunshine
Hospital, will continue to prohibit doctors from treating their patients after they
depart, causing doctors to sever relationships with patients who will then experience
poorer health outcomes.
iii. Prohibit injunctions for restrictive covenant breaches and enforce only
liquidated damages provisions.
Many states prohibit enjoining a physician's practice pursuant to a restrictive
covenant but allow provisions providing for damages resulting from breach,
including damages suffered because the physician competed with the covenant
holder.'" These liquidated damages clauses are often called buyout provisions."'
Scholars and courts have posited that "[1]iquidated damages are less burdensome on
public interests than an injunction restraining the physician from practicing
medicine."3" Although the physician may have to pay damages, the covenant does
not deprive the public of the services of the physician.
347 If the liquidated damages
are cost prohibitive, however, physicians may have no choice but to comply, which
would negatively impact patients to the same extent an injunction would.
348
Jurisdictions should evaluate a buyout clause pursuant to the common law or
statutory guidance in that jurisdiction. Usually this guidance prevents enforcement
of liquidated damages clauses that act as penalties.
3 49 Buyout provisions are better
for patients than injunctions since they potentially allow the physician to continue to
practice in the area covered by the covenant.
3"o
iv. Prohibit blue penciling overbroad restrictive covenants.
For every overreaching covenant a physician contests, there are tenfold the
number of overbroad covenants with which physicians comply and thereby harm
patients.35' In the healthcare context, state legislatures should prohibit courts from
3" See supra Section II.B.i.
345 Koons, supra note 140, at 270-71.
34 Id. at 286.
347 id.
348 Id.
349 See supra note 285and accompanying text.
330 See Koons, supra note 140, at 271.
351 Swift, supra note 258, at 254-55 (describing the in terrorem impact of non-competes and stating
that rewriting an overbroad non-compete does nothing to discourage the covenant holder from 
seeking
the broadest protection possible).
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rewriting overly broad covenants even if merely scratching out grammatically
severable overreaching clauses.35 2 Physician restrictive covenants implicate the
doctor-patient relationship, continuity of care, and access to care.353 Prohibiting blue
penciling incentivizes covenant holders to: (1) craft reasonable covenants narrowly
tailored to serve legitimate interests, and (2) consider the covenant's impact on
patients.354 The legislature should require courts to invalidate overly broad restrictive
covenants. Covenant holders should get one chance to craft a reasonable covenant."'
Legislative prohibition of blue penciling will make lawyers recognize and explain to
their practice group clients that courts will not salvage overreaching covenants;
lawyers and their clients will more fairly evaluate competing interests and consider
transactional options.
v. Enact transactional incentives to lower patient costs and expand patient choice
and access by making covenant enforcement urn on the extent to which the
covenant furthers healthcare reform goals.
The model physician restrictive covenant statute below provides transactional
incentives to expand patient choice and access and control costs to patients by
making covenant enforcement turn on the extent to which the covenant supports
healthcare reform goals. Current frameworks fail to incentivize physicians
to: (1) accept lower reimbursement coverage and (2) reduce costs to patients.35 6 The
model statute below provides these transactional incentives that are critical in the
U.S. where many patients face barriers to care. Below, this Section articulates sample
statutory language that a state legislature could simply adopt. Then, this Section sets
forth sample legislative commentary that instructs contracting parties on how to
prevail at the evidentiary hearing concerning the healthcare reform goals prong of
the physician restrictive covenant statute.
MODEL STATUTE
Enforcement ofPhysician Restrictive Covenants
(1) Enforcement Only to Support Legitimate Interests. The physician restrictive
covenant is only enforceable if it supports one or more of the listed legitimate
interests by protecting the covenant holder's: (a) investment in training,
352 See id.
3 Mike J. Wyatt, Buy Out or Get Out: Why Covenants Not to Compete in Surgeon Employment
Contracts Are Truly Bad Medicine, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 715, 720 n.48 (2006) (citing Derek W. Loeser,
The Legal, Ethical, andPractical Implications ofNoncompetition Clauses: What Physicians Should Know
Before They Sign, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHics 283, 287 (2003)).
354 See Swift, supra note 258, at 231 n.37.
3 See John Dwight Ingram, Covenants Not to Compete in the Professions, 3 FLA. STATE U. Bus.
REv. 11, 24-25 (2002-2003) (discussing the blue pencil rule and stating that "the main criticism of
modification is that it may encourage employers to enter into overly restricted noncompetition
agreements" because "employers will feel they have nothing to lose, since the worst that can happen is
reduction of the restraint to that which a court deems reasonable").
3s1 See supra Part II.
2019-2020 149
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
(b) investment in credentialing, (c) investment in medical equipment, (d) confidential
business information and trade secrets, (d) patient referral sources, (e) ability to
expand patient access to care (i.e., by controlling costs to enable the practice to accept
Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE, or other low reimbursement coverage, and provide
affordable fee-for-service and concierge care).
(2) Reasonableness. The restrictive covenant shall be no greater than necessary
to support the legitimate identified interests. Reasonableness will be evaluated in
terms of geographic, temporal, and practice area scope. Restrictive covenants that
are broader than necessary to serve the legitimate identified interests are not
enforceable.
(3) Healthcare Reform Goals. The restrictive covenant is enforceable only if the
court makes a written finding that the restrictive covenant, in the totality of the
circumstances, supports and does not undermine the following healthcare reform
goals: (a) expanding patient choice and access, (b) improving quality of care, and
(c) containing costs to patients. After conducting an evidentiary hearing allowing the
parties to proffer evidence concerning the restrictive covenant's impact on the listed
healthcare reform goals, the court shall make a written finding determining whether,
after weighing the evidence, the restrictive covenant has the overall impact of
supporting the listed healthcare reform goals.
COMMENTARY
Evidentiary Hearing: Covenant Holder's Perspective
At the evidentiary hearing concerning whether the covenant furthers healthcare
reform goals, the covenant holder (employer) might consider proffering the
following evidence. The employer could present healthcare economist expert witness
testimony illustrating that there are ample physicians in the relevant specialty in the
covered geographic area. This helps illustrate that covenant enforcement does not
undermine patient choice and access and quality of care to the covered community.
The employer could present testimony from the administrator responsible for
creating and administering the covenant that explains how the covenant was crafted
to urge physicians who choose to leave the practice to relocate to underserved areas.
If applicable, the administrator might describe how covenant enforcement in the past
resulted in physicians relocating to underserved areas. The employer might even
craft the covenant to provide a financial incentive for physicians who choose to leave
the practice to relocate to underserved areas, thereby helping to improve choice,
access, and quality in underserved communities.
The employer could present healthcare economist expert testimony to explain
how restrictive covenants enable providers to protect investments in credentialing
and training new doctors, thereby enabling doctors to form small-group practices.
Such small-group practices increase competition by expanding the number of
providers. Competition helps control healthcare costs.
With respect to the individual practice of the covenant holder, a clinic
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administrator could explain how the covenant allows the clinic to control costs which
ultimately enables the clinic to accept lower reimbursement coverage care such as
TRICARE, Medicaid, and Medicare, and provide affordable fee-for-service and
concierge care. The employer could illustrate that patients benefited from the cost
containment that the restrictive covenant facilitated. The healthcare economist and
clinic administrator testimony could illustrate how covenant enforcement ultimately
expanded patient choice and access, while also containing costs.
Evidentiary Hearing: Physician Employee's Perspective
The following is an explanation of evidence that a physician employee might
proffer to prevail on the healthcare reform goals analysis of the model statute. A
healthcare economist expert witness might testify that there is a shortage of
physicians of the relevant specialty in the geographic area covered by the covenant.
A shortage of the relevant specialty could exist in the geographic area, even if there
is a large number of physicians who practice in the specialty, if not all of those
doctors accept lower cost coverage such as TRICARE, Medicare, and Medicaid, and
the physician intends to accept this coverage. This type of testimony supports that
covenant enforcement undermines the healthcare reform goals of improving patient
choice, access, and quality.
The physician might testify about her plans to join or start a practice accepting
lower reimbursement coverage and offering low-cost fee-for-service and concierge
care that the covenant holder does not. Such testimony illustrates that covenant
enforcement undermines healthcare reform goals of containing patient costs and
expanding access to underserved populations.
A healthcare economist witness could testify regarding the importance of
competition in preserving patient choice, access, quality, and cost containment.
Covenant enforcement would preclude the physician from opening a competing
practice in the covered geographic area, thereby undermining competition. The
healthcare economist testimony could explain why competition is important to
contain costs.
CONCLUSION
States should enact this Article's model framework for evaluating physician
restrictive covenants. Specifically, states should require practices to allow departing
physicians to access patient information to fulfill patient notification responsibilities
and refuse to enforce non-solicitation agreements prohibiting physicians from
soliciting their own patients. Second, states should refuse to enforce restrictive
covenants in a way that disrupts continuity of care and should clarify that covenants
can only restrict the location where a physician treats patients and cannot prohibit a
physician from treating patients. Third, states should prohibit injunctions for
physician restrictive covenant breaches and enforce only liquidated damages
provisions. Fourth, states should prohibit blue penciling overly broad physician
restrictive covenants. Finally, states should enact transactional incentives to lower
patient costs and expand patient choice and access by making covenant enforcement
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turn on the extent to which the covenant furthers healthcare reform goals.
Implementing these recommendations will help ensure patients like Albert and
Amelia have access to affordable care and do not suffer a disruption in continuity of
care but can freely choose their doctors.
